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DIALOGUE AND INTERACTION OF THE WEST AND EAST CIVILIZATIONS

The Paper for the 4th International Kondratieff Conference
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YURY YAKOVETS. Dialogue and Interaction of the West and East civilizations.

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In May of the year 2001, which is the Year of the Dialogue between Civilizations according to the UNO, the 4th International Kondratieff Conference 'Dialogue and interaction of civilization of the West and East: the alternatives for the 21st Century' and the 15th Interdisciplinary discussion 'The Future of Russia and Eurasian civilization: Scientifical-Technological Aspect'

Yuri Vladimirovich Yakovets, who is the leader of contemporary school of Russian cyclicism, will present a paper both at the conference and discussion which deals with the typology of civilizations, the justice, as well as historical roots, of civilizations of the West and East being counterpoised, scenarios for interaction of local civilizations of the fourth generation in the 21st Century, their responses to the challenges of globalization, and the place and role for Russia and European civilization in the dialogue of civilizations of the East and West. The paper is intended to pose new issues and to argue for conclusions stimulating to discuss. It also contains a piece of forecast as to the crises which still are due in a number of spheres.

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1. Pulsation of global and local civilizations

To counterpose civilizations of the West and East has become a lity, a truism to pop out now and then in speculations and forecast historians and sociologists, culturologists and politologists are engaged in various countries; quite a bulk of literature has been dedicated to this subject. However, it may be just awarding to be bothered by a sort of questions that only appear to be out of date. Say, how much fair is such a counterposition? When and why did it emerge? Is it going to be preserved in the 21st Century in which we have just entered, and, if it is, what character will it bear in the coming post-industrialism, and under the processes of globalization which came over the planet? Let us start answering these and other questions of today and the future with an attempt to frame typology of civilizations.

The usage of the term 'civilization' is so much diverse that there would be no point in our trying to enlist or compare them to each other; that has been done in the reading-book on comparison studies of civilizations (1. P. 8-35). It will be enough if I confine myself here by referring to the treatment of this category that is exposed in my previous publications (2-6) and in this paper.

In these works the term 'civilization' is used by the author to signify what seems to be two entirely different notions. The term *world civilization* means a certain stage in the evolution of human society from the Neolithic revolution. In this context, six world civilization can be readily identified as complete entities, which are Neolithic, early-class, antiquity, mediaeval, pre-industrial, industrial, and one currently under stage of genesis, i.e. post-industrial. *Local civilizations* reflect peculiarities marking life cycles of complexes of the kindred ethnoses, or states, united by the community of a sociocultural order, including religious beliefs, historical destiny, geo-economical and geo-political interests. Normally, these complexes are also associated with a proximity in a geographical sense. As was shown by Arnold Toynbee (7), historical life term of some local civilizations fits in with the life cycle of one or two world ones as was the case with Sumer, Minoyan, Helladic, and the New World civilizations); other civilizations, such as Hinduist or Chinese, persist throughout all the time space of world history, with recurrent periods of transformation.

What was the reason for one and the same term to be put to a use which would cover different historical and macrosociological entities? Isn't it going to confuse the mind of students and younger researchers in this field? isn't it more awarding to put the verbal frame of these notions as far asunder as possible?

While there is certainly some risk in that, quite a few arguments in the favor of such dualism can be made out. Firstly, both notions express the essence of a *civilizational* approach towards world history. The intention of this approach is to give priority neither to material productive forces or modes of property, which both, according to the Marxist approach, determine the succession of socioeconomic formations, nor to developmental stages in the unfolding of market and democratic rights — the view propounded by liberal approach, but to spiritual re-production and *sociocultitral order* as a genetical kernel of the civilization, both world and local. As long as this kernel survives so does the civilization; once the former is destructed, the historical term of the latter is completed, even if it sometimes leaves an illusive air of its keeping in the existence.

Secondly, the dynamics of world civilizations substantiates itself through changes in the composition and content of local ones. The latter emerged during the early-class world civilization, when states were taking shape, bonds between them growing to be more or less regular. That was the time when the formation of civilizational pyramid was over, a full structure of society that included five 'levels': demographic, technological, economic, socio-politic, and spiritual (2. P. 45). Evolution of local civilizations fulfils itself in the succession of their generations; the second generation formed in 'the axial time', to borrow the term of Karl Jaspers,

in the second half of the 1st millennium BC, and in the early years of the new era; the third generation saw its dawn during the formation of industrial society, i.e. in the 16th — 18th Centuries; the fourth generation is yet under the early stages of its formation, which falls onto the epoch of post-industrialism in the opening of a new millennium (6. P.6; 7. Ch.I; 8).

Thirdly, there is a rotation of local civilizations assuming leading role of the epicenters that accomplish breakthrough to a next stage of historical progress. Before the new era, such epicenters were presented by Mediaeval civilizations (ancient Egypt, the island of Crete, Hellenic cities, or poleis, the Apennines, Hindustan, China). In the 1st millennium the epicenter came over to the East and centers of Arab rebirth. During all course of the second millennium the Western civilization was markedly in domination as it subjugated North and South America, Africa, Australia and Oceania, India, the countries of the Moslem civilization; it also put the ancient Chinese civilization under its dictate. Russia and Japan were perhaps the only one to preserve independence; yet they have experienced immense influence on a part of the processes that took part in the West. However, the later period of the 2nd millennium was the time for the center of creative leadership to shift towards the East, with the Western civilization being relegated to increasingly modest position, the fact which Sorokin and Toynbee were the first to observe (9; 10). The world is tending to be more and more bipolar, although the Western civilization, including North America and Western Europe, takes great pains in a desperate attempt to keep domineering and take advantage of the breakdown of the USSR, which formerly was its potent rival as a kernel of the Eurasian civilization. (10)

Fourthly, in disregard of contentions made by N.Ya. Danilevski (12), Oswald Spengler (13), that no such things as uniform world civilization, and, for that matter, uniform world history are in the existence, and that each local civilization, though going through similar phases of its life cycle, as it does, proceeds by a unique pathway of its own development, an all-planetary civilizational field is still to be identified, that can be associated with such ideas as all-human civilization going through certain stages of its civilizational dynamics, the rhythm of historical progress, pulsation of world history. In the course of all these stages, i.e. since the 4th or 3rd millennia and on, local civilizations have been deeply bound up with each other. They have become intensely involved into multiple forms of the ever-growing cultural and economic exchange, which has culminated at the eve of the third millennium into what is known today as globalization. That, however, is not going to rule out unique character of a local civilization, with all transformations it is doomed to undergo, up to a full extinction from the scene of history, whenever next in turn world civilization is due, particularly one that initiates new historical supercycle embracing a triad of kindred world civilizations (2,3,5).

Fifthly, two variants of historical cycles, i.e. life cycles of world and local civilizations, are inseverably interlinked and interlaced. Transition to a next world civilization, to speak nothing of a new historical supercycle, begins with an ascendant stage, active expansion of leading local civilizations which supersede or replace their slackened neighbors. While under crisis, the fading of world civilization manifests itself in the crises stages of its leaders and greater activity of civilizations claiming leadership in the next phase of the world cycle. Thus the map of the world reflects the ever-going pulsation of world history which is indicative of succession of creativity flashes, relative stability, and under-crisis changes. Once they got underway, these patterns overtake all the spheres of society's life, though with uneven power and divergent forms to be experienced by each local civilization.

In such a way, we obtain firm enough grounds first to identify, and next to research, the dynamics and interaction of world and local civilizations in the common context of planetary historical progress.

Such 'a matrix' way of looking at the dynamics of civilizations should be definitely distinguished from both formational and narrow-civilizational approaches: the former, for its disregarding the peculiarities of historical pathway of different civilizations, or at best confining them to 'the Asian mode of production', as one allegedly contrasted to the Western mainstream, and the latter, for taking life cycles of local civilizations never to come across each other, or

Spengler's rebuttance of universal historical rhythm, incidentally together with a world history.

Of a more insight may seem combination of phasic and civilizational approaches in the way it has been shaped out by editors of the multi-volume *History of East*, which reads as follows: 'Civilizational and phasic approaches can be conceived as respectively a synchronic and diachronic account of reality. Substantially, a distinction between them is that while the phasic approach lays its emphasis upon variability, the other, civilizational one, does upon 'heredity', upon whatever stable were to be there in the given population, going to persist during all its phasic variations. To get the things more simple, it is wrong to counterpoise civilizational and formational approach, just as it would be to counterpoise length and width. These are merely different dimensions of a single historical process.' (14. P.8) From that it follows that historical evolution is the constant of both some genetically pre-ascribed civilizational qualities and a rhythm, stages, and pace of social development.' (Ibid.)

But these observations lack in accuracy, since scholars are at variances about what phases (stages) of historical process really are. One group still regards them as a succession of socioeconomic formations, the first one looking as if it had never begun, and the last apparently having no end, with the dynamics of productive forces being a conclusive power. But there are other historians, who, following I.M. Diakonoff, develop the idea of alternation of historical phases, with a range from the primordial society, dated 40, 000 years ago, and to an eighth phase which got underway in the mid-20th Century, with a ninth one being conspicuous in the perspective and fraught with extinction for mankind before the 22nd Century unless it avoids the unfavorable scenario. (15. P. 352-353). Representatives of the third group look at historical stages as a cyclical succession of world civilizations that reflects human requirements, knowledges, and skills, with whatever may their materialization be, going on in dynamics of all elements of society from the Neolithic revolution and on to infinity, as long as mankind is to exist. (3. P. 252-258, 374-378; 5. P. 103-109, 368-372). And on doing so, they follow the rhythm to be traced over transformation of content and stages of local civilizations.

Nevertheless, the quotation above from *History of East* has propositions in it that ought be taken into account by those in the work on framing a new social discipline, *historical genetics* as a part of sociogenetics and philosophy of history. The flavor of genetics to history was first introduced by German philosopher J. G. Herder (1744-1803) in his work *The Ideas on the Philosophy of Human History*, in which he wrote: 'Raising human kin is both genetical and organic process; it is genetical in virtue of transmission of traditions; it is organic in virtue of mastering and use of what was transmitted.' (Quoted by 16. P. 52). Time is ripe to develop these ideas, and, by having them refined by the achievements of contemporary genetics, apply them to historical process. And this goes to mean recognition of *heredity* regularities in social dynamics, i.e. transmission of bio-social hereditary core, or genotype, whenever a transition from one world civilization to another, or phasic transition in the framework of life cycle of local civilization, has taken place. Next, there is hereditary *variability*, the enrichment of genotype through acquired experience at each stage and phase; and finally, here we deal with both elemental and purposeful *selection* of what proves to be most efficient and viable pieces of mutations abounding as long as civilizations, nations, and ethnoses keep being involved into confrontations and intercourses and flaring like fireworks under transitional epochs. According to a neat remark German philosopher Walter Schubart made concerning these epochs, 'history presents a captivating sight just at the moment when one of the epochs is fading, and outlines of one to succeed it has only started coming into the view; when the line of the rhythmic wave changes its direction; when the wave, on reaching the lowest point, ceases to move down and starts to rise for a next crest.' (17. P. 12). World history happens to be now, in its transcending the threshold of a new century and millennium, in just this period of a break. This gives scientists a privilege of taking advantage of this rear opportunity and to advance in their understanding of history.

Appreciated from such a standpoint, the experience of transformation, whichever civilizational kind it might embrace, is an incontestable contribution into the treasury of historical knowledge; and this experience is subject to a constant exchange as civilizations are

being involved into the intercourse; all we need, actually, is to read the open book of history. The interaction and dynamics in question may appear in variety of shapes; some are based on partnership, others are forcible; there are those that stem from evolution and those from revolution. We should not, however, lay too much emphasis upon shapes; it is not worth stressing out the fact that the dialogue of civilization used to be attended by a cannon's echo in the past, while 'historical progress based on violation has run itself out today', violation no longer being midwife of history.' (14. P. 11, 12). Historical process and dialogue of civilizations will go on in the past, present, and future through a combination of inertia-like evolution and revolutionary leaps, mutual exchange in achievements accumulated by civilizations, from the one hand, and occasional conflicts and clashes into which they found themselves involved, from the other. What really matters is proportion of these forms of interaction. In other words, contradictions and conflicts of civilizations should not be allowed to reach the dramatic line beyond which they are doomed to a mutual destruction, which would dismiss the problem of historical progress for good. Accordingly, the specific ways of West — East interaction in the past and the present, and the prospect of this interaction for the 21st Century, makes a particular appeal for research.

What awaits civilizations in this century? Are they going to keep as sociocultural phenomena, or will they be dissolved and absorbed by some all-planetary community as a logical conclusion of globalization process?

A defiant statement was made by A.A. Zinovyev that 'civilizations has passed away', currently being taken up by social organization of a higher rank. The civilizations that still survive are doomed to extinction. They are replaced by social phenomena which have a new nature and are more adequately fitted to the conditions on the planet today... Since the middle of the century the Western European civilization, the greatest in the history of mankind, has been being absorbed by social organization higher in a rank. That is going to be a union of Western nations in the shape of unified super-national alliances, super-societies, in fact, in that of world super-society.' (18. P. 21—22). He denies the existence of a specific Russian, or north-asian civilization, much as he does with regard to that of African, South American, South Asian, or any other one. 'None of a specific Russian, or Russia's, civilization has ever been there, nor there ever can be one. The peoples of North Asian region, as long as they singularly rely on their own, are unable to build a civilization consistent with the heights of the modern achievements and contemporary human conditions. This holds true for populations of other regions, such as African, South American, South Asian, etc.' (Ibid. P. 24). For Zinovyev, Russia is going to share the lot of an area colonized by the Western countries. 'Westernization of this region has developed as far as leaves absolutely no case to contemplate on a peculiar Russian civilization... Westernization is involvement of north-asian region's nations by no means into the Western civilization, but new social organization of a world scale and into that not in a capacity of its members, equipotent and equal in all other respects to the nations of the West, but in that of minor bodies, even as a colonization area for Western countries.' (Ibid.)

Such opinion is of a specific concern to us in virtue of the simple fact that it brings a certain opinion to a logical fullness, thus unveiling its weak points and exposing it to a broader criticism.

For the first thing, the civilization, as a concept, does not add up to a temporal historical phenomenon, with the Western European civilization taken as a sample, in disregard of the fact that it emerged millennia since civilizational process got underway in the East. A civilization can form and be functional only as sociocultural unity of a group of nations sharing historical destiny. Civilizations enter and quit historical scene; every so often they succeed each other by generations; but as a social phenomenon they will keep as long as man is in the existence. 'The civilizational time' has not gone.

Secondly, globalization, though strengthen it does a multiple integration between civilizations, shaping economic, informational, and geo-political community, fails to eliminate sociocultural peculiarities of nations and civilizations. It does not and will never lead to

formation of unified human mass on an all-planetary scale; and if it did, that would be the point from which mankind would see its end. Multiformity is a premise and propelling force of progress.

Thirdly, the Russian (Eurasian), Indian (the most ancient South-Asian civilization), Latin American, and African civilization do really exist, even if they don't completely fit in with Zinovyev's definition. They have got their past, present, and future, though they transform under impact of globalization and formation of industrial society.

And, finally, the future destiny of Russian, or Eurasian, civilization depends upon whether or not its actual significance and characteristics will be open to our awareness. Upon this depends also its capacity to combat the danger of absorption and colonization by the Western civilization or a globalized society built up by a western pattern.

2. The West - East dichotomy: a civilizational aspect

How much, then, is counterposing Western against Eastern local civilizations justified, which is so trivial these days, and where and how this antagonism can be identified?

First of all, it should be noted that the dichotomic-like counterposition of West and East is at times doubted. This opinion was most evidently expressed by I.M. Steadman in his monograph *The Myth of Asia*. (19). In his view, Asia consists of several sub-continental civilizations, among which he identifies the Far Eastern (China, Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Indochina, including the Buddhist area of Burma, Korea, Thailand, and Cambodia) and the Moslem one (from Marocco to Indonesia). Both these are deeply different in their world outlooks, style of arts, and philosophy. It was the late Mediaeval society before significant dissimilarities between Western and Eastern cultures started to grow. Therefore, the watershed between the West and East is as old as four centuries; in addition, western and eastern civilization, constantly interacting as they do, make contribution into each other's development and adopt the values of each other. (1. P. 261—262).

These arguments deserve consideration. Indeed, the history of Western civilization is enrooted in ancient Mediterranean, which, in its own right, was the heir of the most ancient civilizations of Egypt and Mesopotamia. The Christendom, the main feature of Western civilization according to Toynbee, is, to be sure, a child of East. Toynbee, as a matrix of Western civilization of the third generation recognized Minoan civilization of the first generation which was tightly associated with the East. In his opinion, the Western Christian civilization, as well as Orthodox and Moslem ones, if anyway, can be identified only as civilizations of third generation (6).

That can be illustrated by the history of science. Traditionally, Athens, together with other Greek poleis, and the period 6 — 4 centuries BC are considered place and time of abstract science's birth. However, Vladimir Vernadsky followed the history of science much further back in the history: The creators of Hellenic science and philosophy proceeded in their work from the achievements of scholars and thinkers of Egypt, Chaldea, Aryan and non-Aryan civilizations of the East. (20. P.71).

Besides that, any contemporary civilization has some spiritual values and historical roots in itself which it shares with other civilizations and which form the genotype of world civilization at various stages of its dynamics.

It is also worth mentioning that division of civilizations into western and eastern ones is quite conventional and does not always work when applied to this or that local community. Thus, Mexican philosopher L. Zea (21) noted that modern

Latin America, like Russia, is a product of the synthesis of different cultures, in combination with cultural and racial metisization in the areas of their contact. (1. P. 449 — 451). Ya.G. Shemyakin identifies specific layer of 'marginal' civilizations which are intermediate between East and West; he refers to them Latin America, Russia, Balkan peninsula countries, Spain, and Portugal. (Ibid., P. 453).

This is an utmostly rightful position; it gives a cue how to settle the long-living arguments as to where, West or East, Russia should be referred; it also helps to separate the Latin American civilization from Western one. Basically, no clear borders, like these between states, can exist between local civilizations; there are, however, contact areas in which adjacent civilizations intermingle and mutually enrich each other. For the Western European civilization, such contact areas are Iberian peninsula and Balkans for a Moslem impact manifest in them, and countries of the Eastern Europe (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Baltic region), where the Western European and Orthodox (Eurasian) civilizations encounter. Likewise zones are conspicuous on other continents, too, for instance, in Africa. Intense migrations extend the borders of such zones, making their populations more and more mixed, especially so in Western Europe and the U.S.A. Pitirim Sorokin noted the tendency to decline of variances between West and East. (10. P. 88 —98).

Can it be withdrawn from the above that there is no sense to distinguish between eastern and western civilizations, that mankind is going eventually to transform into a unified world civilization, 'the fifth race', in the terms of Jose Vasconcelos? 'America is predestined to become a cradle of the fifth race in which all the nations will merge. Eventually, a synthetic human and cultural type is going to emerge, destined to combine in itself all wealth of history. Days of the white race, currently the lords of the world, are numbered. Having created modern technology, putting the world go on the machinery, they laid grounds for transition to a new historical period, stage of mixture and dissolution of all nations'. (Cited from 1. P. 445).

The conclusion does seem valid. Local civilizations survived in the past, and, modernized, as they are now, with the transition towards post-industrial society will survive in the future. That is the main source of human viability, dynamics, reproduction, and enrichment of hereditary genotype. However conventional were identifying civilization as belonging western or eastern type along with the existence of contact zones and civilizations of intermediary type, there are principle distinctions between East and West yet to be found, in the way they have shaped during last hundreds and will basically persist in the 21st Century. These distinctions have been stupendously studied by Pitirim Sorokin, N.I. Konrad, B.S. Yerasov (1. P. 246 — 255). Let us expose them to our analysis, which we are going to conduct on cyclical-civilizational grounds, taking into account the contemporary stage of dialogue between East and West.

These differences, first and foremost, are associated with the *sociocultural* sphere, which is a determining basic power in the hereditary core of civilizations, and, more specifically and primarily, mentality, world outlooks, religion, and ideology; also the way in which correlation between person and society is perceived.

Representative of the Eastern type of perception is priority of common interests over private ones, the mass over personality, spiritual values over material ones; oriental is commonly an ideational, super-sensuous, socio-cultural order; there are religions of specific Eastern type, sometimes with inclination into fundamentalism, a delicate apprehension of nature, of which man feels himself to be a constituent. Hence the omnipotence of state, a clear emphasis on conservatism, a very watchful attitude towards any novelties and changes that might make cause people's embarrassment and disavowal of traditions; underrating of the role of science, especially applied and practical one.

The Western type of thinking features individualism, emphasis of human person, and prevalence of sensuous sociocultural mode; it is prone to attack environment, scientific knowledge, and mastering of innovations; western people are keen on expansion and changes, but are wary about the state, and usually wish to circumscribe its interference with economy and privacy.

However, these sociocultural differences are relative and variable. Judging on the contemporary experience of Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and China, eastern countries are capable of taking a rapid advantage of Western-oriented thinking without having to sacrifice their identity so that to effect strategic breakthrough with reliance upon a cluster of basal innovations. Conversely, western countries often experience periods of creative

stagnation, with conservative attitudes in domination. Pitirim Sorokin predicted that both the West and East are moving to integral sociocultural order which combines in itself sensuous and super-sensuous nature, truth (science), goodness (ethics), and beauty (art); he also indicated that the center of creative leadership was tending to the East, and that 'henceforth the history of mankind will be more and more casted for the stage of asian-african-euroamerican theatre' (10. P. 94); while eastern and western civilizations will be brought much closer together, they are not going to lose their unique identity. (Ibid. P. 192).

Variances in *demographic tendencies* are especially manifest between western civilization and eastern civilization. The demographic explosion of the second half of the last century led to a overpacing growth rate of eastern civilizations. According to the UNO, with increase of the world population 2.53 times in the period from 1950 to 1995, the population of Africa grew 3.21 times, Latin America 2.87, Western Asia 3.34, South Eastern Asia 2.65, Southern and Central A'sia 2.74, while that of Europe increased only 1.33 and North America 1.73 times. For next half century (till the year 2050) the average UNO prognostication data feature a greater spread in the gap between both civilization's demographics. With the world population rise estimated 96% from 1995, the population of Africa will be augmented by 3,35 times, Asia 1,89, Latin America 2,1 times, while that of North America will see increase just 1,52 times, and that of Europe won't change at all. Moreover, the Western European, Orthodox, and Japanese civilizations will keep to the tendency to de-population, falling-off of population. (7. Ch.2; 21)

Contrasts in demographic tendencies these sharp, leading to the plaent's further 'yellowness' and 'blackening', mainly stem from civilizational differences. Civilizations of the Eastern type (particularly the Moslem, Indian, and Buddhist ones), much as the mixed Latin American, are prone to create the greater family, encouraging higher birth rates, which reflects certain religious and economic factors. The Western civilization is tending to nuclear family with one or at the most two children; at the present, extramarital and homosexual relationships are gaining ground, not resultant in child birth.

However, here, too, differences are relative, of which Japan furnishes a vivid example. From large families having many children and quite intense natural growth rates (16 men for each 1,000 people in the years 1951 — 1955, compared with 14 in the U.S.A. and 8 in Western Europe), it is going to approach negative ratio of growth rate in the mid-21st Century. North American civilization presents illustration of the opposite tendency, as it still is to display high growth rates in the 21st Century, which is partly due to the ascending surge of immigration from the South and East.

The third aspect to afford distinction between western and eastern civilizations relates to *technology and economy*. In pre-industrial society the East obviously dominated in these spheres, though the gap in level of industrial development being quite insignificant. British economist Paul Kennedy estimates China's and India's annual manufactures in the year 1750 at 32,5% and 24,5% respectively of the world, while the share of Europe (without Russia) accounted for mere 18,1 %, and that of US for 0,1%. Industrialization per capita ratios in China and Europe were equal, little greater than one that was in India, while United States could boast only half that figure. Since the Western Europe, particularly Great Britain, managed to seize leadership in industrial revolution and reap all its benefit, the correlation offerees changed abruptly at the beginning of the 20th Century. In 1900 China accounted for just 6,2% of the world industrial product, India for 1,7%, while Europe (without Russia) and the USA 53,2 and 23,6% respectively. The Western leadership became incontestable. The industrialization ratio of Europe was 35, and of Great Britain 100 times, as high as that of India. (22. P. 149).

The gap between civilizations of the West and East in the rates of technology and economic development was steadily growing in the 20th Century. During the period since 1951 — 1955 to 1981 — 1985 Africa increased its GDP per capita lag from the USA from 16.9 to 19 times and from Great Britain from 9 to 13,1 times. Same indices for South, Eastern and South-Eastern Asia respectively amounted to 37.2, and 30.4 and 21 times. (25. P. 88 — 90). The World

Bank reports that in 1997 the US surpassed Africa south to Sahara by the GDP per capita by a factor of 57,5, South Asia 73,7, Eastern Asia 29,6, Middle East and Northern Africa 14 times. (23. P. 238 — 239).

The immensely greater gap between wealth and poverty is the most grievous heritage left by industrial society. It certainly is fraught to result into civilizational clashes unless the tendency is not reversed. The gap in technology and economics owes much, if not perfectly all, to the features of civilizations; it draws from the Western ingenuity, inventiveness, and venturesome nature; it stems from conservatism and the wariness about novelty that is characteristic of the East. But then this difference is elusive and transient, too. Remind that China fostered a lot many of greatest devices that transfigured the world's picture entirely, such as compass, powder, book-printing, bank notes, etc. Japan figures as a sample of 'economic miracle' to be later taken up by new industrial nations of Asia and by China. Japan cut the GDP per capita lag from the U.S.A. from 4,8 in 1951 — 1955 to 1.5 times in 1981 — 1985; its lag from Western Europe shortened from 2, 6 to 1.04 times (23. P. 88 — 89). In 1997, according to the World Bank, Japan was 32 % ahead of the United States, though it was 19 % still behind them by the parity of purchasing power. (24. P. 239).

The fourth aspect is *geopolitical* relations. In the 18th and 19th Centuries its character as a civilization, technological superiority, economic and military power enabled the Western civilization to affirm its domination nearly over the whole world. By the estimation of Samuel Huntington, in 1900 the Western civilization spread its control over 44.3% of contemporary world, and with consideration for the territory of modern China, a half colonial dependent from the West those days, the figure amounted to 63.6%. This share declined down to 13.1% in 1995 as a result from the collapse of colonial system and demographic boom at the East (25). The fact is, however, that the Western civilization keeps domineering over geopolitical space, and much the more so since the USSR and Warszawa Alliance have decayed. Still the more, it claims to the right of dictate to be executed by the single superpower, unipolar world being its purport.

In 1600 the East was manifestly in domination on the world's political map. The share of non-Russian Asia accounted for 68.1% of the world population, that of Africa for 10. 1 %, while the Western European and North American shares were mere 15.5 and 0.9% (3. P. 65). In the centuries that came next to that the West managed to expose to its political influence overwhelmingly greater part of the world population. Nevertheless, the picture will not keep in the course of the 21st Century; the dynamics and interaction of civilizations are tending to multi-polar world. The movement to such a world is going to alter geopolitical situation. Concomitantly, the danger of civilizational clash will enlarge until mankind eventually transcends tendencies to deeper technological and economic intercivilizational gap which are in domination today and pave the way to partnership.

Therefore, there is every reason to regard interaction of civilizations as a key and axial problem of the 21st Century, at least its first half. On this issue being efficiently settled in short historical terms depends the future of mankind. Let us consider alternative scenarios of this future in the context of interaction between the West and East.

3. Civilizational crises of transitional epochs

At the break of ages and millennia mankind was faced with hordes of deep and long lasted crises uncommon for quite a peaceful time which bursted now in that, then in an opposite planet's region. These crises have come out as a surprise for scholars and politologists of the West and East who seemed to have been overwhelmed by the euphoria of the detente and hopes upon establishment of a long period of peace and prosperity. This prevented them from making out correctly the scale and nature of the crises. Failure to make a diagnosis was responsible for the lack of powerful remedies by which to transcend the disease.

How can the crises cluster of the late 20th — early 21st Centuries be characterized?

For the first thing, these are *civilizational* crises, and not a series of some particular crises

to overtake any single of the society's life and dynamics together with its relationship with the environment. Civilizational crises occur once in centuries. They are based on the world historical process of succession of world civilizations. In this case, industrial civilization, originated from the industrial revolution of the last third of the 18th Century, was quitting the historical scene, to be replaced by post-industrial, creatively-humanistic, and noosphere-informational civilization. This goes to mean, from the one hand, a deep reconstruction of all structure of the society, with none of its spheres left unexposed to the crucial changes, and, concomitantly with the first process, transformation of local civilizations, advancement of new leaders, unsteadiness of the world civilizational field. A poet once said: 'You won't see the face being face to face; the big things are only seen away in a distance.' Not before it would be possible to overview the historical retrospective and long-term vista of the dynamics of world and local civilizations can one be in the position to make a correct diagnosis for the crisis of our time, to see the substance and tendencies of current radical changes, to choose for a reliable remedy to treat illness that overwhelmed the whole of social body.

Sadly, that was exactly what of which both intellectual and political elite fell short; hence abundance of rough strategic errors which make crisis even more lengthy and painful.

The second characteristics of these crisis is that they belong to *sociocultural* sphere, bearing on the transition through many pains from the decaying sensuous sociocultural order being in domination over more than four centuries in the West and the decrepit ideational order at the East where it dominated for yet a longer period, towards *integral* sociocultural order in either, Western and Oriental-like, modifications. This process has certainly much to do with a deep re-arrangement of values, which, going as it is against the background of the old generation being succeeded by a new one, comes about very uneasy; it embraces the whole of spiritual sphere; it is also concomitant with revolution in science, culture, education, ethics, ideology, including religious beliefs.

The inevitability of sociocultural crises, their characteristic features and likely results were unfolded by the greatest sociologist of the 20th Century Pitirim Sorokin as early as in the late 30s — the early 40s in his outstanding 4-volume monograph *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (26). Later, he had many times recourse to this subject in the works that followed (*The Crisis of Our Time, Basic-Trends of Our Age*, and others.) However, his foresight and warnings remained (and in fact still remain today) unheard and underrated by most scientists, artists, politicians, and state leaders. But the coming age will be the time to see his ideas triumph, and *integralism* consolidated to replace the prior liberalism and Marxism.

Thirdly, these crises should be attested as *global*, i.e. overtaking all countries and civilizations, though in a different time and unequal power. The world's energetic and economic crisis of the 1973 — 1974 was its first heave, followed by the world crises of the early 80s and early 90s years which took up most strongly the countries of the West. The Eurasian civilization, standing apart from general upheavals and making profits on the rising world oil and raw materials prices as it seemed, happened to be in the epicenter of the world explosion after it failed to stand the ordeal of transformation; it broke away, earring along with itself in the welter of whirlpool a number of neighboring countries. New industrial nations, 'Asian tigers', as they call them, and China experience an uncommonly long period of growth. However, they, too, can stand apart of tendencies of the world crises, which was demonstrated by the South Eastern Asia crisis in 1998 — 1999. The twenty-years champion growth rates in the economy of China is now coming to an end; indications are that crisis is soon due; there are a decline in consumption demand and greater numbers of manufacture groups with excessive offer, etc.

Fourthly, *the duration and depth* of the crisis are correspondent to the scales of civilizational crises. The transitional epoch of crisis which got underway in the last quarter of the 20th Century, can well last for the whole first half of the 21st Century, including both fifth and sixth Kondratieff cycles. It even can spread over the wave-going crises phases that belong to middle-term and long-term cycles which are fraught with unpredictable changes. Furthermore, the intensity of transformation attacks not merely on the surface strata, but also a part of the

hereditary kernel itself, modifying and enriching it with regard to the hereditary variability regularity.

Finally, it is worth noting that *multi-dimensionness* with which civilizational crisis of the late 20th — early 21st Centuries goes about in *many dimensions*. It is a *demographic* crisis, which makes itself felt in excessive high population growth rates outpacing the growth of resource base which are now experienced by the less developed countries and de-population, decline in numbers, and ageing, anywhere to be seen in more developed and rich countries and civilizations. It is a *ecological* crisis in that it is caused by accelerated exhaustion of natural resources fit to development, immense contamination of the environment, ecological and tehnogeneous catastrophes. It is a *technological* crisis as a result from drop in efficiency of the generations of the fifth technological order which have been worked out and industrial technological mode of production. It is also due to a necessity of large-scale investment into the development of the sixth order that is correspondent to the post-industrial technological mode of production. It is an *economic* crisis due to a crucial contradiction in distribution of property, incomes, rent, and quasi-rent and to wider gap between wealthy and poor countries, civilizations, and strata of population (so-called economic stratification). It is a crisis *of state and politics* for new roles and functions aquired by the state, its legal base, and political parties and movements; there are important changes in geopolitical space, waves of inter-civilizational conflicts. Finally, it is a *sociocultural* crisis, which was already discussed above.

All these crises in adjacent spheres, as they add and contribute to each other, cause a resonant effect, which makes the way out from the crisis still narrower, situation in the world civilizational scale more chaotic and less predictable. This also guides some scholars enuciating the principle-based unpredictability of any changes to take place in society and discarding long-term forecast. It is, to be sure, a tremedoulsy delicate and thankless matter; yet major tendencies and optional alternatives can be identified by prediction. Rather, they need vitally be so, since going in tumultuous sea without compass of prediction is more than dangerous — it is almost certainly fatal.

4. The alternative scenarios for Interaction of civilizations of the East and West in the 21st Century

What are the alternative scenarios of future transition and interaction between civilizations of the East and West in the 21st Century?

Let us consider three scenarios. A pessimistic scenario implies a clash between civilization and consequences into which it would result; an optimistic scenario suggests formation of such a world order as would be based on mutually beneficial and equal partnership between civilizations. It also has to do with their economic development and quality of life being gradual brought closer together with preservation of sociocultural diversity. There is an intermediary scenario, with unsustainable equilibrium being kept for a long period, and intercivilizational contradictions and local conflicts, although perpetually emerging, being partly settled down and not culminating into civilizational clash.

The *pessimistic* scenario is a suicidal clash between civilizations of the West and East with use of weapons of mass annihilation. The War in the Gulf served as a model of such clash; it, however, failed to grow into a intercivilizational clash due to a certain Moslem countries' (Kuwait, which underwent the aggression of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and some others) consent to support the West in this war; in addition, Iraq had no nuclear arms. But civilizations of the East furnish themselves actively with new arms today; India and Pakistan added, to complement China, A-bombs to their armory, together with missiles to deliver them to the object chosen for hitting. Nevertheless, the danger that they once can be employed in a confrontation between the West and East is more virtual than real. For too unequal are the powers, the Western military, political, and economic superiority being overwhelming. Clash danger is more likely to arise between civilizations of the East, for example, between India and Pakistan, which share

overpopulated Hindustan peninsula. The probability of a clash between Japan and the Western civilization is near to nil. China is ahead of other oriental civilizations in general potentiality and military might, but is unlikely to be apt to expansion as long as economic growth persists. The situation, however, will change once China enters upon a period of protracted crisis and lack of sustainability.

Among Eastern civilizations of the most threat for clash is Moslem, or Islamic, civilization. Dissipated over dozens of states with no established and recognized leader to play a role of civilizational kernel, it features high rates of population growth, becoming anxious of life space and jobs for new and constantly enlarging generations. It is also associated with notorious fundamentalist movements which will not hesitate to unleash arm conflicts once they are at power.

Afghansitan, Chechnya, and former Yugoslavia furnish a convincing evidence of this thesis.

Among Western civilizations the North American one exhibits a greater power and aggressiveness, obviously being under the domination of the USA. Enjoying the immense military power, it always fit to activate it whenever coming to believe that their vital interests are concerned, and a trifle threat to safety emerged. The North American is quite young a civilization, composed of the most active representatives of emigrant waves from Western Europe, Latin America, China, and other civilizations, but it claims world domination for itself. The USA, in its own turn, is bound to go through civilizational crisis, which, from the one hand, will advance domestic problems, but can also provoke a wish to settle them with use of 'a little triumphant campaign' methods.

Therefore, the potential danger of clash between civilizations of the West and East quite exists; moreover, it is realized through a row of local conflicts in the areas of civilizational borders. It is unlikely for large-scale clash with use of weapons of mass destructions to burst out in the course of the nearest decades. But later on, if a civilizational crisis takes an unfavorable vector, things can turn different.

That such a threat may be quite real was observed not only by Huntington (25), but also N.N. Moiseyev. A process by which likelihood of clash can grow to the event is due, by his judgement, to the fact that technologies are constantly kept up to date today, always fit to some all-planetary standards meeting a contemporary stage in scientific technological revolution, together with failure of several civilizations to master these standards. 'Where ruptures between civilizations run, fronts has emerged, resulted from contradictions spurred and stirred up by the wave of modernization... If the world community... fails to find enough powers in order to effect a world reconstruction of its organization, these developments can well lead to *hot fronts* aligning the borders of civilizational ruptures.' (27. P. 228 — 229). The clash, therefore, will stem from the deepening of technological and economic gulf between civilizations, which will make those ones that lag behind, but gather momentum in their population rise, to take up arms so that to secure conditions of survival for themselves and future generations. World community will want to focus its effort on the objective to transcend this gulf during the nearest decades in order to avoid suicidal civilizational clash.

The *optimistic* scenario for a gradual formation of partnership in interaction between civilizations of the West and East is more likely than the pessimistic one. There are good reasons to think so.

Firstly, this scenario was in fact much favored by *historical experience* of collaboration, exchange in material and spiritual wealth in the course of millenniums. It is not just wars that stuff history all over, whatever historians might make of it in their partiality. The periods of peaceful cooperation which contributed into dissemination of knowledges, experiences, technologies, and cultural achievements were of no less duration. During all the time that civilizations existed this exchange was stepped up, each time developing to a more intense phase. Silk Road, which connected civilization of the West and East, or the ways which Varangian proceed to Greeks or to Persians by the territory of contemporary Russia. In spite of

all differences and contrasts inherent in local civilizations mankind develops as a uniform, though quite a complicated entity.

Secondly, the fact that civilizations share same *ecological concerns* also bring them to partnership. Natural environment which nations and civilizations inhabit and on which they depend is planetarily universal, with no regard as to the frontiers established by man. There is hardly a civilization today that could make do and develop without maintaining exchange in natural resources with its partners. Air and water pollutioning is obviously a planetary-scale issue, and it is only through joint efforts that the coming world catastrophe is to be curbed. That is the ecological imperative of the modern day, which is to be realized only on a basis of civilizational partnership.

Thirdly, there are very complicated *demographic* processes, crises of depopulation characteristic of various kinds of civilization, and they, too, necessitate co-operation and partnership so that to provide decent life conditions for the future generations. One is unable to cope with these problems successfully all alone. The interlacement of civilizations is becoming still tighter due to migration processes contributing into decrease of poverty and demographic pressure in the outstripped civilizations and stir the blood of decrepit wealthy civilizations.

Fourthly, the prerequisite of ecological and demographic problem being settled globally is an overall mastering of what was achieved by scientific technological revolution and post-industrial technological mode of production, which will afford opportunities for gaps in *technological* and *economic* levels of different civilization to be brought closer, and to bridge the gulf that emerged deep and wide between poor and rich countries during the ages of Western domination. Those falling behind will be unable to solve the issue themselves; they will need the help from those that head the race both in mastering high technologies and, as a main point, training population how to adopt effective use of these technologies. Countries with a low income rate sought not be expected to display technological break-through, these countries being populated by 2,048 million people in 1997, which accounted for 35% of the world total, and having their GDP per capita 73.4 times less than one in the countries enjoying high income rates, where 926 millions, or 16% of the world population reside. The average adult male/female illiteracy in poor countries amounted to 35% / 59% in 1995. (24. P. 239, 241). Such a significant problem can be only approached on the basis of civilization partnership. A heedless delay is only capable of aggravating it. In 1990 — 1997 the average population growth rates in the countries with low income amounted to 2.1 %, while those with the high income featured 0.7%, which is less by 3 times. (Ibid. P. 243).

Fifthly, the pure economic interest based on a sober economic estimation, testifies to the fact that co-operation and partnership of civilizations have payed themselves. It is a basic maxim to postulate that production efficiency, rate and volume of interest chiefly depend on the market capacity, i.e. the scale for competitive goods to be sold. Universal, outpacingly developing market is an incontestable fact. In the period from 1980 to 1996 world export volume rose 2.9 times, from 1,825 billion to 5,398 billion dollars, import from 2,005 to 5,555 billion dollars (by 2.8 times), the volume of direct foreign investing from 191.6 to 313.7 billion dollars (by 1.6 times). (Ibid. P. 277, 279). Annual average pace of growth rates of manufacture goods and services increased globally from 5.2 in the years 1980 — 1990 to 7.0% in 1990 — 1997, indicating 3.3 to 7.8% for the low annual incomes countries and 5.1 to 6.7 % for those with high incomes. (Ibid. P. 259). However, the paces of the GDP growth rates was falling behind considerably, the gap in the GDP per capita getting broader, an indication that the advantages of international exchange in goods and services was mainly turned to their own use by wealthier civilizations. But then this is a short-sighted strategy. One of the most important instruments by which partnership of civilizations operates is more equal distribution of incomes from international trade, world and quasi-rent, which will provide civilizations with low incomes with their own resources for economic rise and modernization. Having in their disposal rich natural resources and inexpensive labor, these civilizations enjoy favorable premises for the growth. It is evidenced by the experience of industrial countries and China that these premises can be

effectively made use of for technological and economic break-through.

Sixthly, we must not ignore *sociocultural* and *spiritual* premises of the partnership of civilizations. The prior belligerence, implacability, towards representatives of alien cultures, confessions, nations, and civilizations yields ground to the understanding of the fact that all human race is going to share the common destiny; that we all are thrown in a small boat amidst the tumultuary ocean in which we can either reach the salvatory coast or to perish together, that there will be no winners in world civilizational warfare. The worship of war and violence gradually gives way to the culture of peace and tolerance. In this affair, informational revolution, spread of multimedia products, and Internet, as well as the overpacing development of tourism, increase of migration flows and personal contacts between people of different civilizations, enhancement of educational standards, reciprocal penetration of cultures are the major contributors.

It is however worth mentioning that this overturn in spiritual sphere benefits, again, to the wealthier civilizations, while poorer ones remain are left without their share. That is exemplified by two facts. Each 1,000 people in the high incomes countries, i.e. 16% of the world population, might enjoy 303 daily-issued newspapers, 611 TVs, and 540 telephone communications in 1995, while those with lower income populations, which is 35% of the world total, availed themselves of 12 newspapers, 47 TVs, and 11 telephone lines; that is, respectively, by 25, 13, and 49 times less volume. In July 1997, more 20 Internet knots were available to 10,000 people of the former group, and 0,06 in the latter one (which is by a factor of 339 less). (Ibid. P. 275). It is, therefore, untimely to allude to 'the *global web*'; the network still comprises a minor part of the world population, wealthier civilizations. Hardly the thesis that inclusion of civilizations with low income in global informational field and active exchange in spiritual values is impossible without support from the side of developed nations needs be proved.

Transition of civilizations to partnership, thereupon, has obviously more in itself than just an Utopian dream or wishful thinking that overlooks real contradictions; it is a vital need, an imperative, without which not only is mankind in the position to count upon its advancement, but also to survive.

But the above prerequisites of partnership bet civilizations, and first and foremost those between the Western and Eastern ones, are not going to be fulfilled by themselves in the way that would bar the tendencies to their clash; it is only combined-efforts of the global community that can really solve such wide-scale issues. An important premise and original impulse to the settlement are working out and dissemination of *a global idea*, a conception of partnership. Though such has been certainly worked out by the greatest intellectual forces of different civilizations, but it still remains in a possession of a narrow intellectual circle, little penetrating into the mass awareness. It is quite necessary that emphasis be laid on scientific interpretation of this idea and its realization by ruling, official, and business elite; it is equally important that it was introduced to younger generations, which will be confronted with the challenges of the 21st Century; this idea should make its way into mass media and Internet. That it is none of Utopian, but a fairly realistic project is evidenced by the full stop of the arms race. In 1983 the estimation worked out in the Calculation Center in the Academy of Science of the Soviet Union under the guidance of academician N.N. Moiseyev which dealt with the consequences of the nuclear winter model along the scenario offered by American astrophysicist Karl Sagan demonstrated that a series of nuclear explosion must result into such a new quasi-equilibrium as is inconsistent with human existence in the new biosphere. (27. P. 7-8). The results of these investigations, set about by mass media, persuaded public opinion and the governments of the USA and USSR, prompting them quickly to make agreements on a reduction of strategic nuclear weapons that was to be run under severe international control. That is essentially another corroborant of the old truism that ideas do really rule the world, given practical steps worked out on their basis.

Intermediary scenarios for interaction of civilizations of the West and East consist in maintaining balance on the verge between co-operation and clash, as ways are tentatively groped for that could lead to prevention and settlement of inter-civilizational conflicts, while the war-

like muscles of the East being intensely blown up by modern arms supplies from the countries of West and East. It should be, however, said, that this way is fairly unpromising, since it is lined up along the gulf. Chaotic developments, in case things will keep standing as they do now, sooner or later are doomed to bring civilizations into clash. In such a way, mankind, given that it still relishes the prospect to survive, has virtually no other ice but prudently to proceed to the avenue of co-operation and partnership.

Time is ripe to conceive and realize this way and this choice, but it is short now, too: hardly any more than two decades are left with the life in store.

5. The challenge of globalization and response of civilizations

On the verge of the 21st Century local, chiefly Eastern civilizations, were confronted by new challenge of globalization, just as they were centuries ago by that of colonization on a part of the West, and failed to meet this challenge with a decent combat. However, in this case we deal with something more significant than just a stage in the international economic and cultural exchange between countries and civilizations that developed for millennia, but a new qualitative step of internationalization of sociocultural and political sphere, with emphasis of strategic decision changing from the level associated with nation and statehood over upon globalization, the over-state level. The implication is that no country or civilization cannot exist and develop other than by maintaining intense and multiple links with its counterparts and partners.

Three whales to support the modern stage of globalization are:

global *economic* integration on the basis of domination of transnational corporations (TNC), which control more than a half of the world GDP and almost all international trade; the share of exchange in the world GDP rose from 39% in 1980 to 43% in 1996 (24, P. 277); the network of global financial agencies has emerged that provides a free inter-civilizational circulation of financial capital and investments;

formation of global *informational* space (telecommunications networks; the world web of Internet; mobile telephone communications, etc.) to provide free currents of information (which covers commerce, science, culture, technologies, politics, culture, etc.) and eliminating borders between countries and cultures;

re-establishment of world *geopolitical* structure as a result from the collapse of Soviet alliance and the USSR, triumph of the ideals of the Western civilization, and increasingly oppressive dictate of one super-power, the USA, supported by military political alliance of NATO, which has already inter-civilizational conflicts.

It is difficult to doubt that globalization is an objectively determined and essentially progressive process; that it is an inevitable element of formation of post-industrial society, and a new stage in internationalization of productive forces; that it stimulates enhancement of labor efficiency, living standards, and cultural exchange.

Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to disregard the fact that globalizations is built up on essentially *westernization* lines; that it is a last attempt for western civilizations to gain wind for its domineering over eastern ones. The following data shed light to this hidden aspect of globalization.

Countries with high income, including the Western European (13 countries) and North American civilizations (2countries), together with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, new industrial Asian countries, such as Rep. of Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, and several East Mediterranean countries (Israel, Qatar, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates) from 1980 to 1996 raised their world export share from 71.7 to 75.7% and world import share from 72.8 to 74.7% (24. P. 277). Taking into account that the lion's share of what international trade earns refills the assets of international corporations, there can be little doubt about those who benefits from globalization of economy. Countries with high income accounted for 79.5% of the world GDP per capita, 73. 4 times more than in countries with low incomes. (Ibid. P. 239).

In 1995, commercial energy consumption per capita in higher incomes countries was

estimated by a factor of 3.8 higher than in middle and lower income countries; vent carbon dioxides were 5 times as high in the former group. (Ibid. P. 257). It should not be omitted that major suppliers of energy resources to the world markets are the nations of the East and Russia, which makes it all the more evident who is a chief actor in exhaustion of irretrievable mineral resources and pollution of the environment.

The daily newspapers issue in countries^ with high incomes, mainly Western civilizations, is 6.2 times as large for each 1,000 people as in the other world; production of TV-sets, telephone lines, mobile telephones, personal computers, and Internet knots are higher respectively by the factors of 3.4, 10.4, 26.2, 25.7, and 133 in these countries. (Ibid. P. 275). There is little doubt about those who is going to draw profits from the headlong upsurge of informatization. Additionally, this is a most monopolized and globalized sector, very few super-TNC sharing bulk of the loot. Finally, the content on which informational currents center is largely determined by those who watch over the interests of western civilizations.

As for geopolitical and military superiority of Western civilizations, it is certainly put to their full service.

Thus globalization is a process to benefit, first and foremost, the West. Moreover, they are also made use of for the intense westernization of the East, imposing upon them English language, the way of thinking, ideals, and the West's unificized culture. In such a way, globalisation is a contemporary challenge thrown out to eastern civilizations, as well as marginal, frontier ones. It has faced the East with a choice: either they will follow all the way of westernization to dissolve eventually in western civilizations, as they will be decreasing to the rank of their periphery, their bad replica with a glorious historical background, with none of sociocultural kernel (hereditary genotype), economic or, in the long run, political independence to survive in the successions of future generations, or they will meet the challenge by taking the way to resurrection and greater cultural difference, as they will preserve and enrich their own culture heritages, outlooks, and styles of life against the background of irreversible multiplication of world-wide economic links. Theoretically — but not practically — a third way is possible, too, if return to isolated, autonomous development of civilizations, curtailment of multilateral links between them, and confrontation could have been effected, with a prospective result of their collision with all consequences implied.

This alternative has been in the center of the dispute led by advocates of 'the world system' and 'civilizationists' on the pages of the *Comparative Civilizations Review* magazine. The dispute was stirred up by publication of an article by American scientist M. Melko in 1994 and summarized in the book *Civilizations and world systems* in 1995 (28). The account of this discussion appeared in the conclusive chapter of the reading-book *Comparative study of civilizations* (1. Chapter XVII).

The most consistent account of the world-systemists' standpoint was presented by Professor David Wilkinson from University of California. He holds that civilizations *are* the world systems, which can be identified by presence of cities and closed systems of relationship; in this view, after the year 1500 the Central civilization began to emerge that gradually took up all other civilizations of the world as a result of the convergence process, civilizational pluralism persisting up to the late 19th or the early 20th Century. However, only one civilization today is in the existence which has completely taken up all the rest (1. P. 536 — 537). It is, of course, the Western civilization, which have taken up both Eastern and intermediary civilizations and transformed the world up to its own image.

As a matter of fact, there is nothing new about these views, for they actually seek to finalize the westernization that developed in the course of second half of the second millennium AD B.S. Yerasov was far from being superficial as he noted that for adherents of world-system approach 'Karl Marx is a significant originator of globalist understanding of social processes. This globalism stems from the postulate that it is division of labor, together with accumulation of capital, that are, in capacity of their both constituting chief productive power, a propelling force of history'. (1. P. 523). It is known how insistent were Marx's followers as they stood for the idea

of alleged elimination of national, to say nothing of civilizational, variances in the future of communist society. This standpoint was made entirely clear in Soviet encyclopaedia. The ripe Communist society can be well expected to see nations merge into a uniform mankind.' (29. P. 880). Since Marxism is one branch of Western economic thought, it fitted the prospect of national and civilizational transformation to a western pattern, in disregard of the peculiarity of eastern civilizations which were alleged to represent degenerative and dying Asian mode of production.

Their opponents upholding civilizational approach do not deny the strengthening and new quality of world-system interaction, but argue that initial social, ecological, and civilizational entities basically survive, and so can a civilizational kernel to be kept by each of them; Eurasia, the West, Islam, Buddhist and Hinduist worlds, and so forth figure as such entities, virtually growing to the status of units of differential or global region. (B.S. Erasov; cf. 1. p. 526). M. Melko points out that not only civilization should be compared, but also studied as interacting entities, in his more general posture of the capacity of some civilizations to master and transform Western technologies. (Ibid. P. 527 — 528).

Which of the above alternative scenarios for interaction and approximation (or departure) of civilizations is most real in the 21st Century?

Firstly, we should rebut the scenario of separation — divergence — of civilizations, back to the state which was before the year 1500, when they maintained various forms of contacts and interaction, but however each preserved its own self-sufficiency and independence, in fact uninvolved into a sustainable system of international division of labor and cultural exchange, Ilya Prigogine made a justified remark, saying that 'time arrow will never go reverse.' An author could get back to the past if he fancied 'time machine', and so and or alike could historian or archeologist. The journey can be nothing but virtual. The intensity of economic, scientific, technological, sociocultural, and information exchange between nations and civilizations has reached the stage beyond which this dense substance is not to be torn without irreparable damage to be caused to every party and whole global community. It is impossible today for every participant of current global integrity to fall back upon an isolationist politics like one Japan pursued before Meidzi reforms.

Westernization or degradation of civilizations of the East (and frontier, intermediary, civilizations, including Eurasian one) stands, however, as a real alternative. 'Westernization under globalization', the currently prevalent strategy drawing on the domination of western civilizations, has taken on many shapes and modes since the collapse of colonial empires. The westernization is built around the domineering rule of TNC in global economics (baptized by N.N. Moisetev 'the world of TNC). 'During last decades a common and uniform organizing structure of human activity has been emerging and affirming itself on the planet which I prefer would be called 'the world of TNC', since transnational corporations have assumed a decisive role in framing the features of further development... The consolidation of the world of TNC is a revolution over a planetary scale, a revolution with the greatness of scope and dramatism of likely consequences which have never been witnessed. It will lead to a full reconstruction of life habitudes on the Earth territory, and that is not a vista concealed somewhere far beyond the horizon, but one to be faced with in the nearest decades.' (27. P. 19 - 20).

Let us lend ear to the voice of the outstanding Russian thinker of the late 20th Century. Hardly it can be contended that TNC adds up to a mere concentration of tremendous financial economic power. In fact, we are faced here by a new global world-order, since TNC have super-national nature, operating beyond the line of civil control, which never transcends national borders; they judge the destinies of governments and political regimes; they bent thinking, views, morals, and behavior of millions of people to their dictate, as they took over information channels, planting Western standards of mentality, behavior, and world-perception. These are the most potent instruments of westernization, really endangering the original nature and future of civilizations of the East.

What can be the East's response to this challenge? Can civilizations which have yielded

so many positions in economy, geopolitics, and sociocultural sphere reclaim their some of their powers to confront the West's vigorous pressure?

The main resource of resistance to western expansion and hotbed of resurrection of eastern civilization is civilizational originality, a unique spiritual world of eastern nations, which formed over millennia.

According to a fair remark of Pitirim Sorokin, 'the nations of the West Europe and both Americas had apparently been lagging long behind these of Africa and Asia in creative leadership since pre-history and on till the 14th Century... During historic times, while Euro-american nations were still having primitive sociocultural conditions, the great civilizations in Africa and Asia, such as Egyptian, Sumer, Babilonian, Hittite, Iranian, Chinese, Hinduist, native american, Mediterranean (Greco-Roman and Arab) emerged, developed, reached heights, and fell into decay, as centuries and millennia passed. Western, or Euro-American peoples, were the last to assume creative leadership of mankind. Roughly only since the 13th Century did they hold up 'the torch of creation', mainly in science, technology, fine arts, philosophy, economy, and politics. They deserved the right to make the Euro-American civilization superior to the civilizations and people of Asia and Africa. The influence exerted by scientific, technological, economic, and political civilizations of the West upon Afro-Asian nations and cultures was irrevocable and overwhelming; it stimulated Afro-Asian peoples strong wish and consistent efforts to adapt Western science and technology in order to exterminate or reduce their poverty, illiteracy, famine, and diseases, to improve their living and eventually to liberate themselves from obedience to the domination of Europe and America. 'The West itself rouses the powers that resist its domination and endow the obedient peoples with skills and lore that can be used in quite efficient way against itself. The Western domination sow seeds of its own desintegration.' These words by S. Raddhakrishnan provide an accurate account of the situation.' (10. P. 90-93). Pitirim Sorokin anticipated the tendency to a shift of creative leadership from the West towards the East. 'The creative leadership of West, which Euro-Americans had a full opportunity to enjoy for over last five centuries, is now coming to an end... As a result, a creative center of human history, localized for centuries in Europe and europized America has completely ceased to be encompassed within these frontiers. It has largely shifted to the East to become 'all-planetary' in the sense of its being active at the East, as well as at the West.' (Ibid. P. 94).

I allowed myself to quote so stupendously because this passage identifies in what seems to me an amazingly precise and expressive manner four major ideas about dynamics of interaction between the West and East.

1) Civilizations originated in the East which for long millennia exercised function of cultural-historical, technological, and economic progress, while Western Europe and America were populated by peoples who were either primitive or lingered upon first stages of civilizational dynamics.

2) It was during last four or five centuries that the West took up the torch of creative leadership (mainly in science, technology, economics, and military) and made use of it to subjugate and exploit the nations of the East. The dereliction of the economy of India may furnish here a bright example, as this country's share in world production decreased from 25.4% in 1750 down to 1.7% in 1900, and its lag from Europe in industrialization per capita rate from 13% came to be as great as 35-fold during the same period.' (22. P. 149).

3) Civilizations of the East can keep and get a new birth after they go through modernization, mastering and transforming, so as to fit their own needs, achievements in science, technology, and culture of the West, which was convincingly exemplified by Japan, new nations of Asia, and China during the last decades.

4) Civilizations of the East are quite likely to join creative leaders of mankind; Japan has already proved that, and so China does these days. But that does not go to say that Western civilizations will be flung back, or loose their creative potential; however, they will no longer be monopolists. Moreover, the technological overturn that currently is underway, according to N.N. Moiseyev, is more likely to be realized in the East. 'It could be that technological know-how will

keep being mainly provided by the western part of the globe, but more efficient labor organization patterns to put them to circulation appear in the East more often than in the West. Before anything else, the new modernization will be difficult for the West, since it will be founded on new civilizational principles... Under new conditions, the role of Western civilization and culture in designing the features of planetary community will be decreasing. Western countries can lose their leading positions. As a bearer of a new *civilizational quality*, the East is going to be remarkably active.' (27. P. 243, 244).

However, a scenario like that, so optimistic for the East, and pessimistic for the West can be realized only if a grandiose counter-attack the West undertakes today be suspended, of which counter-attack as a major combat force acts the North-American civilization. On attempting so, the West pursues the strategic globalization by Western pattern, drawing on TNC and global informational space under its control, mainly telecommunications and Internet.

What is, then, to be done by civilizations of the East (in conjunction with Eurasian and other frontier civilizations) in order to stand this counterassault and to approach multi-polar postindustrial society founded on partnership of civilizations?

For the first thing, there is a need in a *unifying civilization idea*, a thoroughly elaborated theory to reveal substance, cyclical dynamical regularities, and perspectives of civilizations. Such idea stands as an extremely significant element in the post-industrial paradigm of social science. The groundwork of this theory has been laid down by the school of Russian cyclicism, Arnold Toynbee, Pitirim Sorokin, and modern 'civilizationists' in Russia and abroad. However, for the time being this technology has not been accepted by most scientific schools and, what is more important, it has not become paradigm for the mass consciousness and formation of the outlooks of younger generations. Of the foremost importance this fact is for the eastern and Eurasian civilizations, as they soon are going to be faced with a Hamlet's question to be, or not to be in the 21st Century? This question being answered in a solid, well-convincing manner would rise passionate wave in the East, which is vital for revival of these ancient civilizations.

Secondly, *technological modernization*, development and mastering of achievements of contemporary scientific technological revolution and post-industrial mode of production, has a crucial importance for the East. That, in its own turn, requires a great break-through in education so as to transcend general and functional illiteracy and professional incompetence. This is the only way to get out from the gulf of poverty, misery, and backwardness. Technological break-through is bound to change living conditions, to raise labor efficiency by many times, and to enhance subsistence of billions of people. The grandiose economic experiment staged by China, with its more than a billion population, featuring annual economic growth averaged at 10% and enhancement of life conditions by 6%, validates how realistic these intentions can be, and the fallacy of the position taken by M. Golansky and other economists who upheld it that such a breakthrough would be impossible under globalization, backward nations and civilizations being doomed to vegetate in the second and third echelons (30).

Thirdly, the force of TNC which are located within Western civilizations and magnify their *economic power*, should be opposed with the TNC to combine the forces of Eastern (and Eurasian) civilizations and be capable of an equal rivalry with their western counterparts. Japan seemed to have provided a nice example in support of this point, but that didn't have much appeal to others. Another example is the OPEC countries, the union of oil-producing countries, with a reputation to be in the position to throw the Western world into deep economic crisis, now keeping the world oil prices high enough. Unfortunately, most eastern countries and civilizations have not yet realized the community of their interests, which enfeebles their positions in the geo-economic space.

Fourthly, eastern civilizations need steps with greater emphasis on purpose taken, and efforts combined, in the sphere of *geopolitics*. State that belong to these civilizations prevail in the world by numbers of their population, and enjoy majority in international agencies, to begin with the UNO or UNESCO. However, their actions are ill-balanced; nor are they successful in maintaining their best interests against dictate of the Western civilization that is usually prepared

to form into an alliance. Both inner civilizational alliances and more close co-ordination among eastern civilizations in the framework of UNO, Pacific Rim Countries, and other civilizational bodies will be necessary in order to lend a more consistent support to the idea of multipolar world.

Fifthly, and finally, goes the point of really a vital importance: there is a need in thorough realization and maintenance of *sociocultural* originality of eastern countries and civilizations, preservation and enrichment of their millennia-long cultural heritage we currently see wasting away under the impact of the Western mass culture. The case in point is not merely religious fundamentals, as well as the diversity of ethnic, cultural, and ethical traditions together with the world outlooks transmitted by elder generations. However, emphasis upon conservation of what has already faded away or languished, or has been dismissed by history can be equally dangerous. The decrepit ideational order should be brought up to date and transformed into an integral one, wherewith the strongholds of civilizational mentality kept unshaken. It is particularly important to pursue this course in education and mass-media, since these are exposed now to hazardous unificationist influence from Western ideology, which betokens to a gap between generations in the future.

Mentioned above are the outlines of a possible response for eastern civilizations to meet the challenge of globalization on western patterns. If it be any radical, successful, and effective is yet to be seen in the nearest decades.

6. To the bipolar, mono-polar or multi-polar world?

Let us consider alternative scenarios designing interaction of civilizations between the East and West in geopolitical space in the first half of the 21st Century. Three scenarios seem to approximate to the course events can really go.

1) Establishment of monopolar world under the open hegemony of the Western civilization with the USA as the single superpower in the head.

2) Formation of multipolar world with several centers of political, military, and economic force both at the West and East, with a concomitant formation of a new world order to be based on co-operation and, in the long run, partnership of civilizations in settlement of ripened global problems.

3) Recourse to bipolar world with two super-power rivaling for a control over other and weaker civilizations.

These scenarios were considered by O.A. Arin, whose preference seems to be the *bipolar* world. His argument is based on the obvious fact that the 'USA is the only supeipower in the present-day world, and that they are going to keep this status up to the middle of the 21st Century.' (31. P. 86). According to O.A. Arin, this scenario is also favored by the theory of long cycles worked out by John Modelski and William Thompson and 'proceeding from the presumption that there is a recurrent succession of historical global processes every 500 years, each process embracing recurrent, in their own right, the phases of 120-years long successions of political cycles. Some theoreticians add to these phases Kondratieff long waves (that is, 60-years long economic cycles). All these phases and cycles are determined and forecast that ascertain countries-hegemons for this or that period.' (Ibid. P. 86-87). This estimation apparently indicates that the USA have every right to assume the role of hegemon for the first half of the 21st Century.

However, taking shape in the long vista of the 21st Century is the emergence of China as another super-power. To support this thesis, O.A. Arin draws upon the following arguments. The GDP of China grew 5 times from 1978, when the reforms got underway, to 1997, the paces of its growth rates amounting to 9.8%, which is 6.5% higher than the world's average. The foreign trade volume of China grew over the same period from 20.5 to 325. 1 billions dollars by 15.8 times (in current prices). Foreign investment reached in 1997 the sum of 348.4 billion dollars, including \$220 billions of direct investing. The level of consumption of the Chinese is stepped

up by 7.3% a year. Forecast shows that with the annual rates dropping as low down as to 5.5%, in 2015 China will overtake the United States by the GDP rates, which will be 17% of the world total (or 22-25%, to count Taiwan and Hong Kong). The China's military potential will match American one by the mid-21st Century. At any rate, China is going to become a full member of the global game in the 21st Century, featuring scales to be compared to the significance of the USA. (Ibid. P. 92).

Consequently, chances are high that China may stand at the head of an anti-american alliance. 'This anti-american alliance, which is likely to be underway since the 2nd quarter of the next century, by its economic potential will transcend that Western alliance, headed by the U.S.A. As for the military aspect, it will reach strategic parity with the latter party; the mid-21st Century will see, in such a way, restoration of systemic bipolarity, after a short period of multipolarity. (Ibid. P. 106). A mono-polar system can never be sustainable and durable by virtue of the uneven development principle: should a state attain the economic potential and military might of a degree that can be put on a par with the degree of potentials and powers of leading countries, it claims a new status for itself which would reflect the part of influence it enjoys in the world. (Ibid. P. 105).

Therefore, according to O.A. Arin's forecasts, the dichotomy 'East versus West' is going to acquire the character of a 'China versus America' blocs confrontation by the mid-21st Century. But then that is definitely a factor only to arouse the danger of clash between civilizations in a battle for the re-division of their influence.

Indeed, while Russia, India, or whichever other nation, cannot qualify to the role of the U.S. or North American civilization counterpart in confrontation in question, such *bipolarity*, or at least the kind of it that figures in O. A. Arin's treatment, can be taken seriously as one probable geopolitical scenario for the 21st Century. It will, however, demand for its realization a series of much less probable premises, such as keeping of China's current high rates of economic growth and foreign trade expansion for few decades more, which will inevitably be confronted with tendencies of cyclical dynamics, recurrent economic crises, and growing competition on the world market. Such scenario will also inevitably imply high augmentation rates of enhancement of living standards for the population that exceeds now 1,250 million of people and is constantly growing; among other problems to be settled if events follow this line are unemployment, exuberant gap between wealthier and poorer regions of the country, lack of domestic social and political stability under the rising pressure on a part of turbulent market elements and still underdeveloped democratic movement. Final, most important, and least realistic premise consists in recognition of China as a world's new super-power by other civilizations, as, say, African, Moslem, Russian, or Hinduist, which indeed looks a very poor perspective.

Among those who advocate for restoration of bi-polarity is A.S. Panarin. On his opinion, 'the Russia that is due will once again become anti-western and is quite likely to assume leadership of a world anti-western coalition... Thereupon, a *new bipolarity* is to emerge that will have the West, with the U.S.A, at the head, and Russia, in alliance with India, Arab East, and, perhaps, China as its two poles.' (32. P. 68, 69).

While little doubt arises in connection with the first pole, there is still no evidence of civilizational unity at the other. Moreover, the breeding ground of sharp intercivilizational conflicts is there; Indostan, Middle Asia, Northern Caucasus, Trans-Caucasia, and Middle East, to count only few. Russia and the West in fact share the same strategy as they try to fight international terrorism and Moslem fundamentalism. Thus the scenario of a new bipolarity that was suggested by A.S. Panarin has little chance to be seen implemented, at least in the nearest 25 years.

Somewhat brighter perspective seems to be afforded by another scenario suggesting restoration of bi-polarity that draws upon a strategic partnership of China, India, and Russia in the form of an easterrf-alliance to confront the Western one. These countries' populations amount to 40% of the world total, their shares in the overall world GDP and international trade accounting for 20% and 10% respectively. Nevertheless, the first quarter of the 21st Century will

see the share of Eastern triangle in world total population, global GDP, and foreign trade increase considerably. But conversion of strategic partnership into an economic alliance opposed to the West is unlikely, to say nothing of a military-political one.

Even less realistic is the scenario of *mono-polar* world, though the arguments of its adherents seem still to retain a persuading force in the early 21st Century. Pitirim Sorokin, Arnold Toynbee, and even Samuel Huntington admit that the West is gradually losing monopolist power and creative leadership. Yet the developments of the 90-s seem to have been auspicious effect just for this scenario to be validated, being a brilliant inspiration for the world on *Pax Americana* lines. However, the triumph can be nothing but temporal, since the Western leadership in politics, economics, and military will gradually grow out in the 21st Century, as the self-dependence and force of eastern civilizations will be gaining strength. Laying the stress on their privileges as the world 'wannabe leader' and spreading their will over other civilizations, the U.S.A. provoke the East to resist. Any way directed to formation of a global empire is barred in history; attempts to consolidate oneself as its creator and kernel, from Alexander the Great, the Roman Empire, Chinese 'celestial' emperors, Genghiz-Khan to Napoleon or Hitler ruined crashingly. All the more, to gain a position of the world hegemon is even a more weird illusion, considering that local civilizations of the 4th generation are going through period of Renaissance and no one would dare employ weapons of mass destruction to the awe and submission of others without a danger of one's own end.

The best chances to be realized in the course of the 21st Century are with the geopolitical scenario of *multi-polar world*. Here are a few arguments in the support of this thesis.

For the first thing, it is simply the only scenario to be deduced through work of exception method, since the other two, as was demonstrated above, are unlikely because they have a great many things that oppose them.

Secondly, the global transition toward humanistic post-industrial society and integral social order alter the system values, substitutes for the cult of war the culture of peace, co-operation, and partnership in crucial problems.

Thirdly, the current level of military technologies and mass media affords less and less chances for intercivilizational and interstate warfare, violent attempt to bend weaker countries and civilizations to obedience, and involvement of them into the stronger ones' domain of influence.

Fourthly, the late 20th and the early 21st Century are the scene for tendencies to the renaissance of civilizations, formation of their fourth generation, break-down of inter-civilizational states (such as the USSR and Yugoslavia), and rise of national and civilizational self-consciousness. This tendency makes itself clearly felt yet in what seems to be the monolith stronghold of the Western civilization. Gradually, Latin American and Western European civilization became aware of the contrast between their own interests and the new standards and rules in geopolitical game that the North American civilization, chiefly the US, is seeking to impose upon them.

Even less inclined to assume the role of trace-horses to the chariot mono-polar or bipolar world are the Moslem, Hinduist, or Russian civilization. Thus, in spite of the striking contrasts in forces, economic and military might, and political influence of civilizations, the scenario of mono-polar world seems to be the most realistic for the coming century, with the instability characteristic of it as compared to other two. History, however, has never been based on a different logic, always fit to expel license for military leadership, changing the picture of the world all over. And that is rather good, because in such a way it rouses the mutinous spirit of creativity without which mankind would have faded in a monotonous uniformity under a monopolist geopolitical leadership ever getting corrupted.

7. Rent, anti-rent and quasi-rent though interaction of civilization

Our survey of interaction between civilizations would be incomplete if the pictures of formation, distribution, and redistribution of global rent, anti-rent, and quasi-rent be left outside

our concern. These intricate problems have never really been a subject of study, although it is there that a gentle mechanism governing enlargement of the gap between wealthier and poorer countries and.

What with definitions of rent and quasi-rent being more than few, I would like to account for what these notions are taken to mean in this work and development of the ideas set forth in my previous publications (33 - 38).

The *world natural rent*, in my usage, is a supplemental (that is, drawn above one internationally admitted as common) income that natural resources yield to their owners through their product being put to realization on world market. Both national states and private or mixed companies, normally TNC, can be such owners. Three patterns of world rent, as they appear in Marx's research, are differential, absolute, and monopolist. With regard to different species of natural resources, figure land, mining (including oil, gas, ore, coal, etc.), forest, fishing, water, and other kinds of world natural rent alike. Tourist (including recreation) rent should be related to this group, too, though it is social, and not natural, factor that plays a chief role here.

The term *world ecological anti-rent* is employed here as meaning 'damage inflicted upon natural environment and resources in work as a result from injurious exploitation and noxious pollutions (i.e. over-rate extraction, refinement, and transportation wastes of natural resources, ejection of ill-distilled waters, vent gases, radioactive contamination, etc.) All these notions are extended by this approach to a global scale, with national economies and their complexes (civilizations) regarded as agents of global natural ecological space.

As *world quasi-rent* in this understanding appear extra-profits gained by TNC, countries, and civilizations which were first to adopt new and more effective inventions and innovations, generations of technology (technological quasi-rent), pioneering economic strategies and organizations (organizational-economic quasi-rent), financial and monetary mechanisms (financial and monetary quasi-rent), etc.

While basic ground for world rent and anti-rent is a natural factor (natural resource or environment), quasi-rent is reared by intellectual factor, pioneering innovational development of what was mastered by human mind. Thereupon, rent and anti-rent bear a more sustainable and durable character, while quasi-rent is essentially terminal and transient, time of its realization expiring as soon as new technologies, a mode of economy, or financial mechanism, grow to be universally established to determine the level of price for a product or service good in circulation on the world market. At this posture, we however decline deliberately to consider likewise mechanisms that govern formation, distribution, and redistribution of rent, anti-rent, and quasi-rent in the framework of a national economy or domestic market, for these issues have already been a subject of more thorough research; at least rent definitely has been.

Now let us try to investigate the problems of rent, anti-rent, and quasi-rent in the aspect that is our major concern: interaction of civilizations. On doing so, we shall distinguish between the data on western, eastern, and intermediary civilizations, and zones (by which we indicate the groups of countries that do not fit exactly any of local civilizations.)

The country's participation in world rent relations mainly depends on the degree to which it is involved in global market; demonstrated in [table 1](#) are the data on the relevant matter.

The table reveals the unevenness in involvement into world economy and in distribution of economic resources between the East and West.

Table 1.

The shares of civilizations and zones in global population, the world Gross National Product (GNP) and world trade in goods and services, % (24)

Civilizations and zones	Share in world population	Share in the world GNP, 1997	Share in the world export of goods and services 1996	Share in direct foreign investments
<i>Western</i>	12.3	59.1	59.3	57.8
North-American	5.1	27.6	16.2	26.5
Civilizations and zones	Share in world population	Share in the world GNP, 1997	Share in the world export of goods and services, 1996	Share in direct foreign investments
Incl. USA	4.6	25.7	12.7	24.5
Western Europe	6.8	30.0	41.7	28.9
Australia and New Zealand	0.4	1.5	1.4	2.1
<i>Eastern without Japan and new industrial countries</i>	63.0	27.9	24.3	23.3
Japan	2.2	15.9	7.0	0.1
New industrial countries ¹	2.4	3.7	9.8	5.2 ²
China	21.0	3.5	2.6	12.7
India	16.5	1.2	0.6	1.9
Moslem countries	9.0	1.6	1.0	3.4
Africa (South to Sahara)	10.5	1.0	1.3	1.0
<i>Intermediary</i>	17.8	9.4	8.9	16.5
Eurasian	3.9	1.8	2.2	1.3
Russia	2.5	1.3	0.6	0.8
Latin American	8.5	6.4	4.8	12.1
Eastern Europe ³)	1.9	1.2	1.9	3.1
<i>Others</i>	6.9	3.6	7.5	2.4
<i>World total</i>	100	100	100	100

The data in the table exhibit the fact that Western civilizations and zones, which is the home for just 12.3% of the earth population, produce 59.1% of the world GNP, account for 59.3% in world export, and 57.8% in direct foreign investment. The USA are obviously in domination, as their shares in the GNP account for 25.7 %, in export 12.7%, and foreign investments 24.5%, while the number of their population amounting to mere 3.1%.

Civilizations and zones of the East belong to the opposite pole. With Japan and new industrial countries excluded from their numbers for obvious reasons, it comes out that with the 58.4% share in the world population they exhibit just 8.3% of the world GNP, 7.5% of world export, and 18.0% of investments, and that much mainly due to China's contribution at 12.7%.

The intermediary civilizations and zones account for inconsiderable weigh in world economy. The Eurasian, Latin American, and Eastern European civilizations, populated by 17.8% of the world total, have the shares of 9.4% in the GNF, 8.9% in exports, and 16.5% in investments (chiefly due to the Latin America's share of 12.1%). Russia has yet a less

¹ Hong Kong, Singapore, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand

² Without Hong Kong

³ Without Yugoslavia

considerable position over all these parameters: population 2.5%, the GNP 1.3%, export 1.6%, and foreign investments 0.8%.

Thus it is the developed civilizations and nations of the East, together with Japan, that mainly reap benefit from the globalization of economy. With their populations reaching just 16.9% of the world total, they produce 78.7% of the global GNP, sell 76.1% of the global export, and receive 63.1% of investments.

The picture, however, becomes different, as we change our focus over upon distribution of natural resources. Eastern and intermediary civilizations enjoy the world' chief deposits of natural resources, while the developed civilizations and zones act as major customers of these resources and contaminating agents of the environment. That can be followed over the data exhibited in the Table 2 by the example of commercial consumption of energy resources and carbon dioxide vent pollution.

Table 2

The share of civilizations and zones in world energy consumption and ejection of carbon dioxide (24)

Civilizations and zones	Commercial energy consumption		Ejections of carbon dioxide		Per capita rate	
	Million, tn	% to world	Million, tn	%to world	Energy consumption, kg	Ejection of carbon dioxide, tn
<i>Western</i>	3840	46,6	7256	32,0	5401	10,2
<i>North American, incl. USA</i>	2311	28,0	3905	17,0	7887	13,3
<i>Western European</i>	2078	39,6	3469	15,3	7901	13,2
<i>Australia and New Zealand</i>	1420	17,2	3034	13,4	3622	7,7
<i>Eastern</i>	109	1,3	317	1,4	4739	13,8
<i>Without Japan and new industrial countries</i>	2364	28,7	7561	33,3	677	2,2
<i>Japan</i>	1616	19,6	5734	25,3	500	1,8
<i>New industrial countries</i>	497	6,0	1127	5,0	3976	9,0
<i>China</i>	251	3,0	700	3,1	1846	5,1
<i>India</i>	851	10,3	3192	14,1	709	2,7
<i>Moslem countries</i>	241	2,9	909	4,0	259	1,0
<i>Africa (to the North of Sahara)</i>	388	4,7	1156	5,1	761	2,3
<i>Intermediary</i>	136	1,6	477	2,1	233	0,8
<i>Eurasian</i>	1668	20,2	4650	20,5	1931	5,4
<i>incl. Russia</i>	932	11,3	2751	12,1	3329	9,8
<i>Latin American</i>	604	7,3	1818	8,0	4081	12,3
<i>Eastern Europe</i>	463	5,6	1220	5,4	969	2,6
<i>Others</i>	273	3,4	679	3,0	2528	6,3
<i>Total</i>	373	4,5	3233	14,2	597	52
<i>Total</i>	8245	100	22700	100	1453	4,0

Western civilizations, together with developed eastern civilizations, inhabited by one sixth of the world total population, consume about 55% of energy resources and eject into the atmosphere more than 40% of carbon dioxide, while developing eastern and African civilizations which represent 57 % of the world population, consume less than 20% of energy, ejecting about the quarter of all carbon dioxide. Additionally, civilizations of the East, first and foremost Moslem one, and then Russia, are the world major energy suppliers. It would be only consistent with market principles if they appropriated a greater part of world natural rent which major

customers of natural resources, developed countries and civilizations, would owe to them. The latter group also ought to be made responsible for the payment of ecological anti-rent because it is them that cause heavy damages to the environment. These payments could afford an impetus for transcending economic and technological backwardness with further break-through of nations rich in natural resources, which is exemplified by several oil-producing countries. Major steps with the focus on prevention of ecological disaster would be another benefit of these payments. This, however, is not the case. TNC interfere in distribution and re-distribution of rent, appropriating it in vast proportions, while no mechanism to estimate and indemnify for huge ecological damages has never been really worked out.

The situation is different in formation and distribution of world quasi-rent, chiefly with technological one, appropriated by countries that put to the market more efficient machinery, devices, equipment, modern materials, and high-technology services. Share of these services and goods quickly grows on world markets, and so does the volume of technological quasi-rent (see [Table 3](#)). Most of all that is true about high-technological manufacture. O.S. Sirotin's estimation is that 7 highly developed countries account for 80-90 % of manufacture of science-consuming production and almost all exports. These countries own 46 from 50 macrotechnologies providing competitive production, which permit them to levy the rest of the world with a tax on technology. (41. P. 360).

The developed countries' share in supplies of machinery and chemical goods constituted respectively 75 and 80% in the year 1997; these supplies grew 62 and 43 times in current prices from 1960. The share of developing countries mainly grew owing to new industrial countries called 'Asian tigers.' The share of Latin American and especially African civilizations was remarkably inconsiderable. There was a manifold curtailment in supplies of up-to-date production from countries of transitional type of economy, which mainly suggests Russia.

Developing countries figure as pure importers contemporary goods; in 1997 they imported machinery, equipment, and transport facilities for the sum total of 670 billion dollar (with export at 495 bil.), and chemical production for 157 billion (with export at 84 bil.) Transitional economy countries exhibit much the same import to export proportion: machinery, equipment, and transports respectively 31.6 and 18.9 billion dollar, chemical production 10.4 and 8.3 billion. These two groups of countries are the major payers of technological quasi-rent for TNC, which have their head quarters hosted by the developed countries. On transition to new generations of technology and next technological orders the ratio of world quasi-rent escalates, but it *is* at distribution of technological novelties that its absolute magnitude reaches the maximum.

Share of technological goods in export, % (40)

Groups of countries	1960			1980			1997			
	\$ billion	Share in export	Share to the world	\$ billion	Share in export	Share to the world	\$ billion	Times to 1960	Share in export	Share to the world
World export	127	100	100	1993	100	100	5,442	42.7	100	100
Machines, equipment, and transportation facilities	27.5	21.7	100	511.4	25.7	166	2,139	77.2	39.3	100
Chemical products	7.5	5.9	100	147.4	7.4	100	507.9	67.7	9.3	100
Developed countries	85.0	100	66.7	1261.6	100	63.2	3626.6	42.8	100	66.6
Machines, equipment, and transportation facilities	23.8	28.0	85.9	437	34.7	85.5	1610.6	67.6	44.4	75.3
Products	6.5	7.6	86.7	129	10.2	87.5	405.4	62.47	11.2	79.8
<i>Incl. Western Europe</i>	51.2	100	40.2	809.5	100	40.6	2218.8	43.3	100	40.8
Machines, equipment, and transportation facilities	15.4	30.0	55.6	261.2	32.3	51.1	891.9	57.9	40.2	41.7
Chemical products	4.3	8.4	57.3	92.0	11.4	62.4	282.6	65.7	12.7	55.6
Developing countries	29.4	100	23.1	577.6	100	29.0	1594.9	54.2	100	29.3
Machines, equipment, and transportation facilities	0.2	0.7	0.7	28.3	5.2	5.5	494.6	2473	31.0	23.1
Chemical products	16.3	1.1	4.0	10.6	1.8	7.2	84.3	281	5.3	16.6
<i>Incl. Asia</i>	14.4	100	11.3	372.0	100	18.7	1201.1	83.4	100	22.1
Machines, equipment, and transportation facilities	0.1	0.7	0.4	22.6	6.1	4.4	410.7	4107	34.2	19.2
Chemical products	0.1	0.7	1.3	5.9	1.6	4.0	65.0	650	5.4	12.8
<i>Africa</i>	6.4	100	5.0	94.2	100	4.7	88.6	13.8	100	1.6
Machines, equipment, and transportation facilities	0.1	1.6	6.4	0.4	0.4	0.1	1.6	16.0	1.8	6~1
Chemical products	0.1	1.6	1.3	1.2	1.3	0.7	3.2	32.0	3.6	0.6
<i>Latin America</i>	8.6	100	6.8	109.2	100	5.5	284.7	33.1	100	52
Machines, equipment, and transportation facilities	0.03	0.3	0.0	5.2"	4.8	1.0	78.2	2,607	27.5	3.7
Chemical products	0.1	1.2	1.3	3.5	3.2	2.4	14.2	142	5.0	2.8
Transitional economies	13.0	100	10.2	155.1	100	7.8	220.6	17.0	100	4.1
Machines, equipment, and transportation facilities	3.7	28.5	13.4	46.1	29.7	9.0	41.8	11.3	18.9	2.0
Chemical products	0.6	4.6	8.0"	7.8	5.0	5.3	18.2	30.3	8.3	3.6

From that Paul Kennedy draws an unhappy conclusion that yet fits the situation. 'That results into ever growing inconsistency between the countries that enjoy wealth, technologies, high standards of health care, and other privileges, and those that have rapidly growing population with none, or almost so, of these privileges. Demographic explosion in one part of the planet and technological explosion in another does not add to establishment of stable world order. (41. P. 387). That plants another root into the soil of confrontation between the West and East, one of the roots to be only eradicated by joint effort.

8. Russia and the Eurasian civilization: the bridge between the West and East

Whether there is the way to settle the radical problems in the interaction between West and East that were the subject of our survey above vastly depends upon the destiny and position of Russia and the Eurasian civilization that it heads.

Let it be noted that the place of Russia in world civilizational space is not easy to identify. A few approaches can be employed.

Some scholars speak of the *Russian* civilization, alluding to the ethnic sense of the word, and counterpoising it to the Western one. 'Civilization of Russia was essentially spiritual, while that of the West had chiefly the character of an economic consumption. The Chinese and Indian civilizations have much in common with the Russian civilization. Today this confrontation between the Western and Russian civilizations forges the future destiny of the world, for if the Western civilization gains eventually an upperhand, the world will become a huge concentration camp where 80% of the world population, encompassed by the barbed wire, will manufacture goods for the other 20%. The consumption race without any taboos which is the practice of Western countries will result into the exhaustion of global resources and death of mankind.' (42, P. 8, 9). However, any attempt to distinguish between 'spiritual' and 'consumption' civilizations can be only a matter of convention, for any civilization has both these elements, not to delve into the specimens of high spirituality ^that abound in the Western culture. Besides that, this approach curtails the framework of the local civilization, with the Moslem and Buddhist constituents to be excluded from it. Finally, the hostility towards the Western civilization cannot be justified, as it breeds the seeds of discord and confrontation.

N.Ya. Danilevsky identified *Slavonic* cultural-historical type. Indeed, it embraces the great variety of nations to which Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Poles, Czechs, Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, Macedonians, and Bosnians belong. According to the data of UNO, in 1997 296 millions of people, or 5.2% of global population, resided in Slavonic countries. They produced the GDP at \$624.6 billions (2.2% of the world total), half of which was Russia's contribution. The rate of GDP per capita amounted to \$2112 or 9.1% of the Western European one, ranging from 9612 in Slovenia to 715 in Ukraine, as cited by the 'Nezavisimaya gazeta' newspaper on August 4,2000. However, while ascending to a common Slavonic world, these nations in fact belong to different civilizations and confessions, which was vividly exemplified by the conflict in former Yugoslavia, as Orthodox, Catholic, and Moslem groups, in spite of their sharing the same origin and most recently citizenship, murdered each other. The term 'Slavonic civilization' is seldom to be heard these days.

Of a more broad usage is the term '*Orthodox* civilization'. Among those who employed it were Arnold Toynbee and Samuel Huntington. Alongside with Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, it also comprises Armenians, Georgians, Moldavians, Yakuts, Romanians, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Ethiopians. Huntington estimates that the Orthodox civilization accounted for 13.7% of the world territory in 1993, held under its political control 6.1% of world population and yielded 6.2% of the world economic product. Orthodox communities are scattered all over the world. However, Moslems, Buddhists, Catholics, and Jews, to say nothing of non-believers (though their numbers have grown vastly in the 90-s), constitute a considerable part of Russia's population. The thesis that civilizations should be classified over confessional principle seems to carry much conviction. I would rather agree with

N.N. Moiseyev in that 'it is not that much that religion makes civilization, but rather civilization picks a certain religion and accommodates it to its spiritual and material needs. Any civilization emerged earlier than a religion did that was accepted by this or that nation, and civilizational standards are seldom to change.' (27. P.225). Quite apart from that, there is a simple fact that multi-confessional civilizations can exist, too (such as Japanese, North-American, and Eurasian).

Since recently, the term *Eurasian* civilization, with Russia taken to act as its kernel, entered into general use. Eurasian idea was actually put forward by Russian emigrant scholars in the 20-s. These days the idea of resurrection won support with N.A. Nazarbayev, the President of Kazakhstan, who advocates creation of a Eurasian union. (43). Such understanding of the local civilization is more awarding than to define it as Russian-ethnic, Russian-nation, or Orthodox, in that it sustains neutrality with regard to confessions and displays unity of commitments, cultures, and historical destinies of the multi-confessional civilization. Furthermore, it reflects position of a bridge, a link joining Europe with Asia into a single eurasian continent which is the home for almost three forth of the earth population. However, this civilization occupies only part of the mainland, and only a minor share of the population of Eurasia lives here. Thus the name of this civilization proves to be ampler than its real content, suggesting the voice of exuberant ambition. Nevertheless, in want of a better choice, we have to assume this definition, which gains wide spread these days.

What is the basic *character* of the Eurasian civilization? Where does it belong in the general classification? Should it be related to the Western or Eastern civilizations? This matter is subject of a hot discussion, with the range of opinions varying tremendously. Without going too far into details, I shall try to elucidate my own point of view.

The Eurasian civilization, as it was at the moment it started to shape by, the early years of second millenium on the lands of Kiev and Novgorod, belongs to the Christian civilizations of Europe. Lying en route of the Greco-Varangian trade and political itinerancies, it was reared by the joint action of two major historical influences. From the South, through Kiev, it was exposed to Byzantine culture, a heir of the Greco-Roman civilization. From the North-West it experienced the influence of Scandinavia and other parts of Baltic, which came through Novgorod and Pskov, ever first Russian republics. Adoption of the Orthodox religion emphasized the Byzantine sociocultural aspect. In the reign of Yaroslav Wise I, links with the Western European world became notably diverse.

However, in the 13th and 16th Centuries Russia fell into the area of growing influence on a part of eastern civilizations as a result of a number of factors, among which were the broader intercourse and mutual exchange with Khazars, Polovtsy, and other Russia's eastern neighbors, Mongol-Tatar conquest followed by a long period of the vassalage with the Golden Horde; the subjugation of Siberia in the 16th Century which incorporated vast numbers of Siberian peoples into the Russian State.

The period from the 18th to early 20th century was marked by the tendency to bridging the gap that separated Russia from the eastern civilizations, the strategy that was most emphatically pursued under the reign of Peter the Great, Catherine II, and Alexander I, and was resumed in the first quarter of the 20th Century by Bolsheviks as they were staging their grandiose experiment on construction of a new social order on purely Western-Marxist grounds. However, since the 30-s, when confrontation against the Western world of capitalism was running high, a movement towards the East got underway that was not merely confined to the variety of participation in local revolutionary affairs, but also made an open use of oriental despotism as an instrument of domestic policy. The totalitarian state under Stalin was a modified sample of this despotism.

The Western impact gained a new wind on the eve of the 60-s and reached acme in the 90-s, when an audacious and reckless attempt was made to plant in the Russian soil the borrowed samples of the Western civilization, without a hesitation to ruin its own one, so far as this plan questioned the existence of the USSR and the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance, and to discard a considerable part of historical heritage. Such policy could produce no positive result, for delicate sprouts of the Western civilization did not take roots in severe Russian soil, while

infatigable Russian plants which knew how to put up with it have been ruthlessly trampled down.

That the new grandiose experiment on westernization of Russia has obviously very little promise but a great danger became the fact of mass awareness in Russia since the late 90-s. What have been being collected for centuries, went to waste in the dullest manner. The matter in question was the further destiny of millennia-aged civilization. Aggressive neighbors commenced struggle for the partition of succession that suddenly was opened after what sometimes was a powerful civilization that faced up the West and in a manner serving a shelter for enfeebled civilizations of the East.

Gradually, comes realization of a dramatic error in choice of the course, and that priority should be given to Russia's own geopolitical interests. Much concern arises in connection with the question of the place for Russia in the civilizational niche between the West and East. The oriental politics of Russia has sharply intensified that arouses great dissatisfaction among Western leaders.

What are, then, the *prospects* for Russia and the Eurasian civilization in the 21st Century?

To contest the role of world leaders or to rival on a par with powerful civilizations of the West, there is too little effort they can afford to spare. Therefore, focus on leadership with regard to formation of a coming world order can blow up bare expectations and bring a new experiment to collapse. In addition, the events of the 90-s cut sharply the former image of a leading nation amidst its kin.

In spite of all these, Russia does retain the niche it can very well to cultivate and make the place for efficient activities. This niche should *bridge the West and East* so that to prevent them from coming into a clash and maintain partnership. To help this aim be achieved, Russia, as well as other countries of Eurasian civilization, can take advantage from such factors as perfect geographic location, historical experience, great culture which assimilated achievements of western and eastern civilizations, and specific toleration, capacity to understand and adapt what has been accomplished by other nations. These premises have been clearly set forth by N.N. Moiseyev. 'The North of Eurasia is a bridge between two very distinct civilizations, a means to borrow experience and wisdom from the *both coasts*. The system of Russian traditions, a perfect match for many features of the European West as well as peculiarities of the Far East, can provide a spiritual factor of a great positive consequence. These opportunities, be they put to a sensible use, may open quite a promising prospect for our country. Russia's role can prove to be extremely important against the build-up of confrontation between a group of Asian Pacific civilizations and the Euro-American civilization.' (27. P. 249, 25,0.)

This approach corresponds to the idea voiced by Nikolai Berdyaev as early as in 1908. 'World history essentially depends upon conjunction between the West and East, but such a thing can be only possible on the premise that the West and East would both disavow the limitations of the outlooks; they should draw upon one another for new knowledge. Either part of the world should follow its own lot and mission. Not before Russia fulfils its mission of intermediary between the East and West will it really reach eminence.' (44. P. 132). In the book *The Destiny of Russia*, brought out in the far-away year 1918, Berdyaev evolved his idea. 'Russia should present a type of eastern-western culture which will transcend the unilateralism, together with positivism, materialism, and the complacency of its circumscribed horizons, that are inherent in the Western culture. We should step to the world's great spaces. And in these spaces the ancient religious origins of cultures should be apparent. The East should remain the equal to the West.' (45. P. 387). Berdyaev underlined that transition towards a cosmic world-perception is due. 'Social and political consciousness are both going to face great spaciousness, the problem how to master and govern the whole of globe's surface, and how the West and East can be brought closer together, so that cultures meet each other, mankind unite through struggle, and human races enter in a free intercourse.' Here is essentially anticipated the problem of interaction and dialogue between civilizations of the East and West, which comes to a full rise before mankind in the early years of the 21st Century as a problem of its survival and which was

recognized as a key one at round-table on dialogue between civilizations during the summit of millennium in the UNO on September 5, 2000.

But to use the last chance to preserve and revive the millennium-aged Eurasian civilization, there should be a number of necessary premises that are not easy to be provided. Let me draw them in outlines.

First. A new *geocivilizational* strategy should be elaborated, consistent with the scientific argument and rested on a sober estimation of Russia's resources and possibilities, and its place both in the post-industrial society currently going through transformation and the future integral sociocultural order. A particular emphasis should be laid upon the need to preserve originality, a genotype of Eurasian civilization and to reverse the process of its currently falling into a fast decay. Advantage should be taken of its beneficial location as a geographic and geopolitical bridge, a balance-wheel between the potent civilizations of the East and West.

This strategy must be accepted as a major highlight of perspective policy of the state. It should win support and acclaim with the Russian people, and recognition on the side of eastern and western civilizations, which, in the long run, themselves are in want of such an intermediary. The country will need to dismiss its current model of sociocultural development, according to the true remark by A.S. Panarin. This scholar points out that for Russia to fulfil its role of connecting link that joins the West, leader of the industrial society, and the East, which presently undergoes an upsurge, it is necessary that the unjuring practice of westernization be transcended and new bridges to the countries of Pacific Rim built. 'We should effect shift towards the East and replace our orientation from the Atlantic model to the Pacific one, to the active dialogue with our Far-Eastern partners.' (46. P. 151). To frame the same in a more clear phrasing, we will need to work out such a model of our own that will combine, and add to, the merits of western and eastern civilizations that correspond to the paradigm of post-industrial society. Russia will have to become initiator and propelling force of active dialogue and efficient interaction between the civilizations of the East and West.'

Secondly. We should make it sure as clear as possible which *values*, precisely, can Russia offer civilizations of the West and East, and what will be going on by the Eurasian bridge between them. It is quite obvious, that as economic partner, Russia today is of little appeal to the West, the latter regarding it more like a source of raw materials (which however is being rapidly worked out) and market for sales of manufactured goods (which is circumscribed in virtue of the Russia's population low purchasing capacity and underdeveloped processing industry). From the other hand, Eastern civilizations may take interest in several high technologies formerly mastered in industrial complex. Russia can afford a few beneficial transportation opportunities for greater cargo and passenger services between the countries of the Western Europe and the Far East, which may yield Russia some transportation, in particular tourist, rent. But the significance of these factors should not be overestimated in view of the fact that cargo charges are relatively low these days. Nor can Russia rise any considerable funds for crediting, or investing in, Western countries, in spite of the fact that the export, or escape, to put it properly, of the Russian assets in the 90-s came out as a gold rain for some national economies.

Technologically, there is not much Russia can offer to both the Western and Eastern markets, and even less can be offered by the other CIS countries. TNC use their every effort to suppress those Russian rivals that can still produce high technological goods. Actually, they have already bought all what was there promising in science, technologies, and intellectual products for a song, while technological degradation leaves the national economy with no financing or concern to effect accelerating reproduction of new achievements.

Much is always to be heard about the interminable abundance of Russia's natural resources which allegedly might secure it an opportunity of 'clipping coupons', i.e. to earn the world rent. But these are unforgivable illusions. The best mineral and forest resources are being quickly worked out and exhausted, and nothing is there in spare to replace them. Also, a steadfast economic growth, if underway, will cause exports of raw materials and energy

resources to be cut due to growing inner demand, and anyway the deposits of natural resources suffered irreplaceable damage as a result from predatory exploitation.

This spares, as a single kind of national product of which the West and East both can be in want, *spiritual re-production*, and first and foremost fundamental science, culture, and education. These products are all the more valuable, considering their role of the utmost importance in the post-industrial society.

For the second time in the 20th Century has Russia found itself in the contrast focus of the sunset of industrialism, and it has so again in the condition of national catastrophe, which happens for the fourth time during its millennium-long history. But that sent impetus for a creative daring in formation of the post-industrial scientific paradigm. This paradigm is going to unfold the regularities of cyclic-genetic social dynamics, the prospects of society, the formation of noosphere, a harmonious co-evolution of society and nature. (3. P. 200-210).

Russia is home of a sublime multi-national culture, which influenced immensely the cultures of the West and East in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Today we witness a surge of spiritual sphere, with groundwork of the culture being laid that would be consistent with the integral sociocultural order.

The Russian system of education, lagging far behind the Western and Japanese level of adequacy at technical equipment though it is, practices wide and at the same time profound training, draws upon creative methods of teaching, and is set on a fundamental base of social and natural disciplines, which provides new generations with quick and feasible adaptation to changing conditions of labor and the everyday.

The respect and tolerance towards alien views and confessions that are inherent in Russian mentality, as well as capacity of standing severe experiences, are all the elements of the ethics of the future, although the moral clarity of Russian society is rapidly getting obscured in the 90-s.

Thereupon it is the emphasis and concentration on outstripping trend of socio-cultural sphere that can afford Russia a unique chance of becoming a bridge between the West and East; not a bad replica of either culture, but a specimen of synthesis and integrity of their best achievements, effective dialogue and interaction.

Third. As a major obstacle that impedes Russia's assuming the role of a bridge between the West and East stands the rapid process by which the Eurasian civilization is losing *integrity* ever since the crashing break-down of the Soviet Union resulted into the feeble and amorphous CIS that sprang up from its fragments. Moreover, the decay of Russia, to be succeeded by a number of independent states within its former territory, has been openly brought up to discussion by Zbigniew Brzezinski (11) and Igor Yakovenko (47), as they voiced their unambiguous statements. This tendency first made itself apparent on the Northern Caucasus, with a result being a long-term inter-civilizational conflict. To serve good, the bridge between civilization of the East and West, it should be firm and solid to keep standing at any shakes. Thus a vitally important premise at which Russia would fulfil this function is that CIS countries and Russia should reintegrate, and a steady, efficient, and mutually beneficial exchange be resumed in economic, science, technologies, and culture between separate links of a single mechanism, which has been forming for millenniums. Any speculation on the civilizational role of Russia and CIS would be swindling and misleading, eluding to face the gloom view of reality. While vigorous steps are taken now in Russia which aim is to regain the country's integrity and restore the hierarchy of state authority, there is a lot of unceasing series of meetings, conferences, and colloquy carrying on in the framework of CIS, with little really undertaken. The idea of Eurasian Union as a form of re-integration of Eurasian civilization that was brought forward by Nursultan Nazarbayev (43) has been left hanging.

With this objective in view, peoples and ethnic communities that constitute the Eurasian Russian civilization will need a clear idea of self-identity, together with understanding of a uniform character of this civilization, community of basic concerns, and the destiny of inter-related nations. It can be well agreed that, as N.N. Moiseyev has it in one of his latest works,

'Russia is not merely the North of Eurasia, populated by nations of various ethnical origins. It is an integral and self-sufficient civilization, symbiosis of nations, synthesis of cultures; an alloy which propagated a general world outlook and general mode of life... The geopolitical position of Russia is not just magnifying its potential which never was other than immense. It also adds to efficient use of the best achievements of western and eastern civilizations. Russia binds them, opening vista to co-opt their own values in a new eurasian synthesis.' (27. P. 6, 10). The observation above can be fully referred to all the nations of Eurasian civilization that not only have a centuries-old history of the joint response to dangers and challenges from the outside, but also share inner strategic concerns in the tough century that got underway, as they are being faced with the challenges of mono-polar world and globalization on the western lines with the only super-power at the head and domineering TNC.

Fourth. Russia and the Eurasian civilization can pioneer establishment of new partner-like relations both with the West and East. Much as Utopian it would be to advocate the course aimed at becoming a part of the West, with Western standards, mentality, and life fashions, as they are, being transplanted into Russian and Eurasian soils, and the Russian and Eurasian own centuries-old heritage and peculiarity of cultures ignored, no less so it would be to seek for a new confrontation with the West, indulging oneself by a pipe-dream of seeing restoration of bipolarity, i.e. confrontation of the two world super-powers, the USA and Russia. Such a posture can create nothing but to pump out the last saps from Russia that have already been strongly exhausted over the last decade, which relegated the country to more than a humble role on the global stage. N.N. Moiseyev guides the only choice to be made. 'In my view, Russian people, rather than 'to enter into Europe', have their mission in a sensible use of the peculiarities of our civilization, as well as our own natural and human potential, in order to become a good, faithful, and equal partner of Europe, not singularly with regard to European peninsula, but also these marginal spaces that, by the definition of Toynbee, lie in the middle of two civilizations. Russia has always been something of an alternative to the West, in spite of its ever being behind it in its development. Today, time is ripe to change over from confrontation to mutually beneficial partnership. And that is the will of time itself, that is an utmost necessity! Not only Russia needs it, but the whole planet does.' (Ibid. P.7-8).

No less important a necessity is to alter our apprehensions of eastern civilizations, to overcome the tendency to a slackening interest in them which started to prevail over the first half of the 90-s, and to get back to traditional and multi-lateral economic, science, technological, and sociocultural connections with them. The community of geopolitical and geoeconomic interests of Russia, China, India, Vietnam, Japan, Korea, and other nations of the East consists not in forging a new military political alliance to be opposed to the West, which is unrealistic as well as dangerous, but in realization of the multi-polarity principle. This principle guides the ideas of dialogue and partnership of an enculturated world order that would allow to settle intricate contradictions and challenges left by the 20th Century, and to change the character of the emerging globalization in such a way that would make it possible, alongside with TNC and 'the gold billion' countries, to reap its benefits for all peoples and civilizations.

Fifthly. The revival of Eurasian civilization, much as its fulfilling a pioneering function of the binding element in relationship between western and eastern civilizations can stem only from *a passionary impulse*. The concept of this term suggests active and well-consolidated vanguard carrying along with itself the masses of society and giving example to other peoples and civilizations. None of these, however, we can witness so far. The political (governing), business, and intellectual elite, split, separated, too deep in equivocal ambitions and battles for power and wealth, has lost the sense of responsibility for the country's destiny it should bear to its own people and generations to come. Nor is there ideological orientation to be shared by entire nation and civilization, with an eclectic dump of different cultures, religions, and outlooks being piled all over instead. In this connection, a frightful warning of Pitirim Sorokin comes to mind that 'it is impossible for the West, East, and all human culture to keep being a disfigured, huge, and eclectic 'dump' filled with whichever fragments of sensuous, ideational, integral, or other

sociocultural collections. Any great culture that started its life by transforming itself into such sort of a permanent dump loses its individuality to become just a material, just a civilizational fertilizer, a manure for other great civilizations and cultural systems. And any people, society, or nation which are unable to create a new sociocultural order to succeed one that has decayed ceases to be a leading 'historical' people or nation, and comes to be 'ethnographic human material' to be taken up and used by more creative societies or peoples.' (10. P. 106-107). Such threat is quite real, may the tendencies that have formed during the 90-s be let keep and go for a mere decade. In such a case, any making use or taking advantages of the West to East bridge function will be out of the question, not any longer one up to an effete and decayed civilization which Eurasia will be.

It is noteworthy that indications as to the major role Russia retains in civilization process and construction of bridges between the West and East are to be found, apart from Slavophiles and opponents of westernization, also in the writings of some prescient Western thinkers, which is brightly exemplified by the book of German philosopher Walter Schubert *Europe and the Soul of the East*. It was first brought out in Switzerland in 1938, and recently published in Russia. Schubert predicted shift of cultural emphasis, succession of leadership from Western Europe to Slavs, particularly to Russians. 'The West presented mankind with the most perfect specimen of technologies, statehood, and communication, but deprived it of its soul. The task for Russia is to return the soul to mankind. It is Russia that is possessed of the powers that Europe has lost or ruined in itself... Russia is the only nation today that can save Europe, and it does save it... The Russian has got premises for doing so, which none of European nations has not.' (17, P. 22, 33, 34). In the conclusion of the book the prospects for eastern -western reconciliation, and the role of Russia in one, are set out clearly and expressively. 'Russia, I refer to one not of the present day, but one that is due, is a cheering wine with the ability to bring to life the effete existence of contemporary mankind. Europe, in its own turn, is a tough vessel for us to keep this wine for good. The revival of mankind, associated or, rather, concomitant with the purpose of Western - Eastern reconciliation, should be focused on the Russian aspect; that is, aspect of life, not of shape.' (Ibid. P.307).

Many things both in the East and West have changed during the six decades that passed after this passage was first exposed to the public, many things indeed, to think of Russia. After the unseen bloodshed of civilizational clash had been brought to an end vastly due to the crucial role of the USSR, the Western European civilization underwent a booming rise, with the USA establishing themselves as a single leader of the West. Having gained fresh impulses, ancient civilizations of Japan, China, and India gathered speed. The Eurasian civilization reached culmination in the 60-s and 70-s, but ruined in the 90-s, which was hardly anticipated by many. While the picture of the world being completely different today, the same irrevocable question nevertheless keeps standing sharply, placing Russia again in the focus. Could it restore to life and give a second wind to historical developments of the 21st Century, or have it exhausted in the main its spiritual and material potential to belong for good to the periphery civilizational process? On how this question is answered depends the destinies of civilizations of the East and West.

Conclusion. Time is ripe for a big choice.

Every so often - in fact, once in a few decades or centuries, - any individual, collective, nation, civilizations, and even mankind - are faced with a fork at necessity to choose on which way they are going to proceed for their further steps to the future. A choice like that can be deliberate or not; consequently, the result in the end can be immensely different from what subjects of historical drama set for themselves to be achieved. Thus it is so important to ponder correctly and timely range of alternatives, and to consider consequences to follow from strategic decisions whenever taken or realized. And it is indeed so both for leaders and the masses of ordinary men joining them and paying for their dramatic mistakes.

On the eve of the third millennium A.D. mankind was faced with a great choice. Course of events has changed, everything in the world coming to be obscure, unsteady, and chaotic.

The historic period of industrial society, with all its achievements and contradictions, is over. Time is ripe for crises and changes which no family and nation can avoid. A new axial problem that has gone to the fore is the interaction between civilization of the East and West, a choice whether they go into clash or become partners. The force of inertia that emerged from old tendencies breeds the seeds of a suicidal clash of civilizations which obviously will leave no place for mankind in the biosphere of Earth. Only a break in trend is the way to buck against this danger, to change over to partnership of civilizations, which will be the major form of interaction between them in the 21st Century.

The West suggests, and quite insistently realizes, its own choice: globalization on the basis of westernization and domination of TNC; a mono-polar westernized world in which other civilizations are bound to dissolve. This is the last attempt to restore industrial society, a decaying sociocultural order doomed to retreat from historical scene, in an up-to-date fashion featuring a growing gap between poverty and wealth.

The East displays an opposition to this prospect which is tending to be more deliberate rather than instinct. The East has made another choice: multi-polar world, partnership of civilizations in settlement of global problems, creation of decent conditions of living and development for all people and nations of the planet, not just for the gold billion at the expense of other billions. Nevertheless, civilizations of the East are disconnected at the moment; nor they have got adequate knowledge, will, or power to constrain the vigorous attack of powerful western civilizations.

There is yet a third scenario that suggests formation of a new bi-polarity, in which the Western civilization alliance guided by the USA, prevalent in economic and military force, is opposed to an eastern alliance embracing most of the world population; as a rod of this alliance, a union of three nations of Eurasia is conceived. This scenario jeopardizes the integrity of the world, which can fall into two hostile blocs once again, with the danger of their conflict being ever growing. Also, there can be little faith to the probability that the Russian (or Eurasian), Chinese, and Indian civilizations ever would be able to develop into a kind of a solid union in military or political matters, in spite they indeed share the same geopolitical concerns and gravitate one to another.

In this situation the role of Russia and Eurasia at large as a bridge to connect the West and East enhances immensely. Although itself being at the verge of decay due to a series of dramatic mistakes, this civilization still has enough spiritual potential with which not only would it be able to restore itself to life, but to fulfil its historic mission of a deliberate choice of the effective means to solve the axial problem of the 21st Century, which is working out a mechanism to guide co-operation and partnership of civilizations of the East and West. This potential developed from the marginal and flexible character of the Eurasian civilization, its spiritual diversity, historical experience, and the sociocultural order which is near to integral. But before ever to meet this challenge Russia and the Eurasian challenge should become fully aware of themselves and their place in global civilizational space. They will have to take the way of revival and reintegration, and to overcome the results of one of the greatest catastrophes ever to happen during its millennium-long history. This is a last chance, and it must be taken.

Scholars, thinkers, intellectuals will assume a crucial role in the choice of reliable way. It is ideas that govern the world, changing it, becoming the wishes of the millions of people, guiding their activities. History has imposed upon social scientists a highest responsibility. They have to make a correct diagnosis to contemporary global crisis mankind is going through today, to ascertain realistic scenarios, together with consequences into which they are to result, of the future developments, to identify aims and means as to avoid a clash between civilizations of the East and West, with further transition towards their partnership. And this partnership, be it ever established, will make it possible to settle key issues and contradictions of globalization, to develop a humanistic noospheric post-industrial society and integral sociocultural order, to

bridge gradually the gap between poor and rich nations, and to improve living standards in a way that will satisfy all people, not only selected species. Every man or woman should ascertain their role and measure of their responsibility for this great choice before the generations to come that will determine the destiny of all nations and civilization, all mankind in the 21st Century.

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